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Edward Said’s major academic study, Orientalism details his argument of how Western 
literature and academic studies pertaining to the Orient, the Middle East and North Africa in 
particular, have purported an inferior, almost subhuman view of the Arabs. In his later volume, 
Covering Islam, he further elaborates on how Orientalism has changed through the 20th century 
and uses American news coverage of the Iranian Revolution as a case study to show how 
Orientalism is purported in a modern context.  
 My aim is to look how Orientalist rhetoric and imagery has evolved and changed since 
Said’s original thesis was released, and to what extent Orientalism it has changed since. I plan to 
use a variety of American mainstream news outlets to compare and contrast their coverage of a 
given event, and use Said’s thesis, as well as independent Egyptian news coverage of that event 
as a point of reference. I plan to use incidents that are considered influential in the progression of 
the Egyptian Arab Spring and have received significant news coverage in the American 
mainstream media, such as the “Maspero Massacre,” the “Port Said Football Massacre,” and the 
coverage on the election of President Morsi that have happened in Egypt as a part of the Arab 
Spring as case studies as to see how vastly of Said’s definition of modern Orientalism has 
evolved. Through this project, I hope to show how modern Orientalism is manifesting in news on 
Egypt, one of the most influential countries in the Middle East in regards to American foreign 
policy, and how mainstream coverage of these incidents shows a significant shift away from 
typical Orientalist representations. I hope to prove that there is indeed, significant evidence to 
believe that Orientalist aspects are beginning to become less evident in news coverage, and more 




The late scholar Edward Said’s most significant and controversial work, Orientalism, 
originally published in 1975, argued that Western literature and academic texts have portrayed 
peoples of the East, or “the Orient,” as exotic, innately irrational, erratic and as a subhuman 
“other.”  From the late eighteenth century through the nineteenth century, as colonialist pursuits 
were running high in North Africa and the Middle East, Orientalism itself was used as a 
justification for such expansion. Said states, “Orientalism can be discussed as the corporate 
institution for dealing with the Orient … by make statements about it, authorizing views of it, 
describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it, in short: Orientalism as a Western style for 
dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”1 It was defined as a “network 
of interests,” not simply a way to rationalize inferior views or colonial involvement in the East.2 
As we are well into the twenty-first century however, this notion does not hold nearly the same 
relevance as it did in the nineteenth century. In fact, Orientalist representations have taken on 
different forms. Twentieth century representations had a focus on representing Islam as a solid, 
tangible concept that can be used as a describing term for Middle Eastern peoples. This was 
extensively done with Iranians in 1979, and the concept of Islam as such was used to replace the 
use of political context or social context when covering a news story in the region. This has 
proven to severely generalize Iranians during the revolution, as Islam “ … has always 
represented a particular menace to the West.”3 
 Though Orientalism itself, as Said acknowledged, is difficult to define it as a set and 
straightforward term. It is essentially an institutionalized school of thought to exercise cultural 
                                                          
1 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 3. 
2 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 3. 
3 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1981), lii. 
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superiority over peoples of the East, whether it is for economic advantage, political hegemony, 
or cultural hegemony. 
Said wrote a second installation to his series on Orientalism in 1981 titled, Covering 
Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World after the 
Iranian Revolution and as the new Islamic theocratic government was taking shape in the country, 
as the definition of Orientalism change. This shift occurred from the exotic, “Oriental” images of 
the early modern European colonialist era, to perhaps, more subtle insinuations that portray the 
peoples of North Africa and the Middle East as culturally threatening. The notions that continue 
to carry over from nineteenth century depictions are the collective identity that is given to 
Middle Easterners and North Africans. For example, instead of referring to the peoples of that 
region as “Orientals” as was commonplace in the mid-twentieth century, Middle Easterners 
begin to be referred to as part of the “Islamic world.” This “Islamic world” is a term for a 
synonymous Muslim society, as portrayed in mainstream American news media. “Islam” as a 
term not only referred to its following but began to represent anything considered to be a threat 
to America, but also used as a concept to replace the need for context or background in a news 
story. The term, according to Said “has licensed patent inaccuracy [and] expressions of 
unrestrained ethnocentrism, cultural, and even racial hatred … All this has taken place as part of 
what is presumed to be fair, balanced, responsible coverage of Islam.”4 This was apparent during 
the Iranian revolution as the term “Islam” referred to the ominous entity that turned a former ally 
nation into one ruled by a menacing, popular government. The core of Orientalism as viewing 
peoples of the Middle East as “the other” is still prevalent. However, aspects such as its purpose, 
and common terminology have proven to evolve post-World War II.  
                                                          
4 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1981), li. 
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While aspects of Orientalist representation remain in modern American mainstream 
media is an ever-changing concept, a fact which Said recognized. “I really believe … in the 
existence of a critical sense and of citizens able and willing to use it to get beyond the special 
interests of experts and their idees recues … At that point, humanistic knowledge begins and 
communal responsibility for that knowledge begins to be shouldered. I wrote this book to 
advance that goal.”5 This means that Orientalism is a concept that changes with the time and 
historical context. Said uses the coverage of Iranian Revolution as an example of how 
Orientalism had manifested in the news media, quite different from Orientalist thought seen in 
nineteenth century literature and other written works by historians and authors. Orientalism at 
this time was always in the context of justifying particularly French and British economic and 
colonial pursuits in North Africa and the Middle East. Since World War II however, this view 
changed to portray the peoples of the region as foreign “others,” as potential threats to the West. 
In particular regard to covering topics regarding Islam or the so-called “Islamic world,” Said 
pointed out that, 
“For the right, Islam represents barbarism; the left, medieval theocracy; for the center, a 
kind of distasteful exoticism. In all camps however, there is agreement that even though 
little enough is known about the Islamic world, there is not much to be approved of 
there.”6  
 
Though still rife with generalizations when referring to individual nations, these characteristics 
in contemporary Orientalist representations have lessened. Many current representations are 
narrower in geographic scope, and place less emphasis on ideological factors playing a role, such 
as Islam, in newsworthy and historically significant events. Peoples within the region are 
beginning to be given active voices in the stories being reported from the region. Individuals and 
                                                          
5 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1981), lix. 
6 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1981), lv. 
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different groups of people are being recognized by nationality, by political ideology, and are 
shown to have differences in opinion. This is one of the factors in modern day coverage that is 
showing a shift, even if a small one, away from Orientalist representations that would 
characterize the peoples of a nation or region as one monolithic, abstract entity. With the coming 
of the Arab Spring, and the overwhelming popular movement for self-sufficient government, 
current Orientalist representations are visibly lessening. These representations are portraying in 
various ways that Arabs and North Africans as intellectual, and capable of eventually 
establishing a flourishing, fairly governed society to the many Americans who consume 
mainstream media.  
 What the project itself aims to prove is that Orientalist representations in the mainstream 
American news media have indeed shifted in geographic scope. Geographic scope is the extent 
to which generalizations are made in terms of Egyptians’ religious and national identity, and how 
these events are conveyed in how the consequences will affect American interests. Modern day 
Orientalist representations are lessening, and show recognition of a national identity, and 
different segments of the population within a given nation. As was seen with coverage of the 
Iranian revolution, there is a stronger proclivity to give political and social context to large-scale 
and devastating events, rather than place the blame on concepts such as Islam. Overall, news 
coverage is showing signs of disusing Orientalist representation. I will use three significant 
incidents during the beginning of the Egyptian Arab Spring that have received considerable news 
coverage by the mainstream American media as case studies to demonstrate how Orientalist 
representations take shape. Specifically, I will focus on Orientalist characteristics such as scope, 
use of context, or inclusion of how the case relates to American interests. Essentially I will 
attempt to answer through this thesis: what aspects of modern Orientalist representation are still 
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visible in mainstream media? To what extent are they potent in a piece of news coverage?  In 
order to present a close reading and analysis, I will focus on news coverage from among the top 
three most widely circulated print publications in the U.S. in 2011 to 2012 specifically The New 
York Times and The Wall Street Journal.7 I will also be analyzing coverage from the two most 
viewed news channels in the country, CNN and Fox News.8  
As a point of comparison, I will be looking at three Egyptian non-state sponsored 
independent media outlets. I will be presenting the accounts of these events from these sources 
not necessarily to point out “the truth” of what happened in these incidents, but rather to show 
how these outlets, run by Egyptians, choose to represent themselves in the context of these tragic 
events. One of these outlets is a citizen journalism collective called, Mosireen. They report on 
marches, protests, and the aftermath of violent altercations from a grassroots level, and derive 
their accounts entirely from filmed interviews with eyewitnesses. They also report on the lack of 
resources to the working class and villages within Egypt due to government shortcomings on a 
grassroots level. Since this is a source unfiltered by government influence, or in Mosireen’s case, 
run on public donations, or this is an appropriate resource to see how Egyptians on a grassroots 
level hope to represent themselves. I will also be using the most widely read independently 
funded print newspaper in Egypt Al Masry Al Youm. For the purposes of this project, I will be 
using its sister, English-language paper titled Egypt Independent. Lastly, I will use an English-
language daily newspaper that is also among the widely read publications among English-
speakers in Egypt, The Daily News Egypt. Because this source is aimed at an English speaking 
                                                          
7 Alliance for Audited Media, "AAM: Total Circulation for US Newspapers." Last modified Sept. 30, 2012. Accessed April 10, 2013. 
http://abcas3.auditedmedia.com/ecirc/newstitlesearchus.asp 
8 Jesse Holcomb, Amy Mitchell, and Tom Rosenstiel, "The State of the News Media 2011 - Cable: By the Numbers," Pew Research Center's 
Project for Excellence in Journalism, http://stateofthemedia.org/2011/cable-essay/data-page-2/ (accessed April 21, 2013). 
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audience within Egypt and throughout the Middle East, this will be useful in looking at how 
Egyptians aim to portray themselves to a non-native or foreign audience. 
I plan to focus on US mainstream media coverage of three major incidents that attracted 
global, including American media attention after the fall of the Mubarak government in February 
2011. What makes the events that I plan to explore unique out of the other notable clashes and 
strikes that have happened is that they were each covered significantly in the American 
mainstream media. In addition, these events were each among the most violent since the initial 
January 25th uprising, and produced numerous casualties. I plan to focus on incidents that 
occurred particularly in Egypt over the last two years is because of varying discrepancies that 
have been presented between Egyptian non-state media coverage and American mainstream 
coverage and because each incident presents pressing issues in modern Orientalist 
representations in the media, whether it is the occurrence of sectarian violence, or the perception 
of Islam. 
The first incident occurred in October 2011 and has become known by Egyptians as “the 
Maspero massacre,” when over twenty-five people were killed during a protest in front of the 
Egyptian State media building (known as the Maspero building). I plan to reconstruct how the 
US mainstream media typically portrayed this event as a sectarian Muslim-Coptic Christian 
conflict, whereas Egyptian independent media outlets portrayed the incident as a military-
instigated attack on protesters, who were predominantly Coptic Christian, but included Muslims. 
One of the most notable features in how this incident was covered was the inconsistent account 
between Egyptian independent media and the American media, and even between the American 
news outlets themselves. 
 11 
The second case I plan to focus on is the Al Ahly soccer riot which also occurred in 
February 2012. These riots attracted worldwide attention, though in the US media it was 
frequently reported that fans of one team (Al Masry) had instigated the violence against fans of 
the other team (Al Ahly) and that at least seventy-five people were killed. Independent media in 
Egypt, however, offered a contrasting interpretation of these riots, suggesting that hired thugs 
from within the crowd of Al Masry fans instigated the violence in an attempt to portray the riots 
as another sectarian conflict. The non-state sponsored Egyptian media saw it as a plausible 
explanation because of the Al Ahly fans’ avid support for the ongoing protest movement.  
The final case I will cover in this project is the election of President Mohamed Morsi in 
June 2012 and the beginning of his administration as the first elected president, and Islamist 
president in Egyptian history. With this election, many American news outlets expressed doubt, 
and uncertainty on the future of Egypt and how this reflects on Egyptian public opinion. 
Conservative and broadcast outlets saw his election as a premonition of the spreading influence 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, and perhaps a growing popularity among Egyptians 
towards the Brotherhood and Islamism as a governing ideology. However, what is not covered 
thoroughly enough in this media is the context and background of the elections themselves, 
which segments of the population voted and had access to knowing who each of the candidates 
were, and  how influential the Muslim Brothers were to Egyptians living in poverty. Print media 
also saw the election as a sign of the rise in influence of Islamist parties in Egypt, however in 
liberal print publications the context surrounding the elections and circumstances in which 
Mohammed Morsi won is made clearer. 
Each of these newsworthy incidents tie into a significant characteristic of modern 
Orientalism that Said defines in his original thesis. The first deals with religious sectarianism, 
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and how American media portrays the relations between Muslims and Christians currently in the 
post-January 25th era in Egypt and what has changed from the coverage in 1979 when Muslims 
and Christians were referred to in broad, international terms. The second deals with sectarianism 
in terms of football club rivalries. We will investigate how a violent altercation at a football 
match was covered in American media and how the lack of detail and context in the coverage of 
the incident draws a depiction of mass thuggery among the fans in the football stadium at the 
time. The third deals again with the portrayal of the role of Islam in Egypt and public opinion 
with regards to politics in the midst of the Arab Spring. 
 When analyzing the coverage of each of these incidents, it is important to take note of 
certain keywords used in twentieth century representations. This will serve as criteria for 
determining what has changed in twenty-first century Orientalist representations. These 
keywords are words used with heavy frequency in the coverage of significant events in the 
region that often become associated with Middle Eastern peoples negatively as a result. “Mob” 
and “riot” were crucial keywords prevalent in the way the Iranian Revolution was covered in the 
Western media, and subsequent events in the region as was stated in Said’s Covering Islam. Such 
words were used to refer to mass mindless demonstrations, as opposed to referring to the people 
as “Orientals” as was done in early portrayals of Orientalism. One indication in looking for these 
heavily used words is that they are typically used in general contexts, serving as “umbrella” 
terms for subjects that require far more analysis. Other words that were also often used in 
covering the Iranian Revolution that we will find in some modern mainstream media reports are 
“militant,” “dangerous,” “anti-American,” and associating “anger” and “rage” to the bulk of the 
populations that are being covered. 
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Another criterion I will use to analyze the change in twenty-first century Orientalism is 
the Huntington notion, derived from Samuel Huntington’s article published in Foreign Affairs in 
1993 titled “The Clash of Civilizations?” Huntington argues that future interactions around the 
world will not involve ideology or economics (such as classifying nations in to first, or third 
world countries), but rather, culture, and that these interactions will be violent, to varying extents. 
In this article, Huntington characterizes nations by ideology.  This is an example of one of Said’s 
criticisms of characterizing a nation and people under umbrella terms. Whether he is referring to 
Muslim peoples of former Yugoslavia, North Africa, or in Central Asia, they are all 
characterized as “Islamic people.” He even refers to Islam as if it is a physical region. In one 
example, Huntington states “Islam has bloody borders,”9 and he starts a sentence by saying “On 
the Northern border of Islam …”10 when elaborating on tensions between Muslims and 
Christians in Eastern Europe. This insinuates that people belonging to religion factor into his 
definition of “civilization.” Huntington’s view in this article is perhaps the prime example of 
what Said would consider Orientalist thinking. However for this reason, I will use the 
characteristics stated in this article as a link to draw on when analyzing American coverage. The 
extent to how similarities are shared between Huntington’s article and the representation of 
Egyptians in American coverage is telling in how much Said’s definition of modern Orientalism 
remains in the media. 
 Another criterion that Said discusses is how national identity is characterized. The way 
that peoples of the Middle East were portrayed, in this case, the Iranians, were as one monolithic 
entity, all belonging to the umbrella of “Islam.” Any other differences were not worth 
mentioning. Even when covering other newsworthy events on the 1950s-1980s, the notion of 
                                                          
9 Huntington, Samuel. "The Clash of Civilizations?." Foreign Affairs, 1993. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-
huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations (accessed April 10, 2013). 
10 Huntington, Samuel. "The Clash of Civilizations?." Foreign Affairs, 1993. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-
huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations (accessed April 10, 2013). 
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Islam being an overarching cause to such events, Said stated in Covering Islam, that “ … much 
of the dramatic, usually bad news of the past decade including not only Iran but the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, oil, and Afghanistan, has been news of ‘Islam.’”11 The peoples involved in those 
conflicts or incidents are again generalized under the umbrella of Islam. Not only as an umbrella 
term was “Islam” used by the media, but also Said mentions that the term meant one of two 
things. “To Westerners, and Americans, ‘Islam’ represents a resurgent atavism, which suggests 
not only the treat of a return to the Middle Ages but the destruction of what is regularly referred 
to as the democratic order in the Western world.”12 Cultural differences, languages differences 
let alone, socio-economic or political differences were not discussed in the mainstream news 
coverage at that time.13 We will notice that broadcast media outlets such as CNN and Fox News 
each share some common traits with Huntington’s article, whereas print media outlets such as 
the New York Times and The Wall Street Journal will prove to be much less prone to 
generalizations and older characteristics of Orientalism. Print outlets in some cases even prove to 
be similar to the Egyptian independent media coverage, which we will use as a comparison for 
how American mainstream media portrayed the incidents we will discuss. In the three cases 
covered, there is an evident gap in how mainstream print provides context to a news story and 
how broadcast cable news networks do so. 
 As we are well into the twenty-first century, Said’s definition of Orientalism and what 
makes up an Orientalist representation remains unchanged. One can expect to find differences 
however subtle from how the news was covered during the days of the Iranian revolution, and 
certainly from the early nineteenth century depictions of exoticism. While there are certainly still 
                                                          
11 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1981), 83 
12 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1981), 55 
13 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1981), 85 
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similarities between American coverage of Iran in 1979 and coverage on Egypt in the current 
day, several aspects are shifting. In older coverage of Iran, terms such as “the Islamic world,” or 
“the Muslim world” were common phrases used to describe uniquely Iranian issues. Such 
generalization has not happened in the coverage of Egypt, however generalizations do still 
appear on a much smaller scale. Print outlets delve into subdivisions among “Egyptian Muslims” 
and note the differences in opinion. Another evolving aspect of Orientalist representation is what 
these incidents in Egypt mean for the West. The only incident in which we see traces of this is 
when Mohamed Morsi was elected President and it is speculated on what it may mean for 
American interests in the Middle East. These incidents are seen in a different context. 
Additionally, “American” rather than “Western” terms are used, further indicating the narrower 
geographic scope. Also, the reasoning behind these incidents in the American media, though it 
varies between print and broadcast media and outlets within those realms, is no longer entirely 
blamed on “Islam” as an ideological or tangible entity as was done when covering the Iranian 
revolution. These are the most significant aspects that make up the new formula of Orientalist 
representations. We will explore how each of these aspects vary and how changes within these 









CHAPTER ONE: The Massacre at Maspero, 10/9/2011 
Background 
The Maspero incident, often called by the Egyptian independent media as the “Maspero 
Massacre,” is perhaps most telling of the state of Orientalism in the contemporary American 
mainstream media. Varying and sometimes conflicting accounts have emerged between The New 
York Times and The Wall Street Journal, and Fox News and CNN. It was either portrayed as a 
sectarian conflict between Egyptian Muslims and Christians, or a massacre against a Christian-
majority march. The incident itself was a tragic and bloody one. The currently widely accepted 
account among Egyptians is that on the night of October 9th, 2011, a group of mostly Coptic 
Christian protesters, along with Muslim supporters, held a march to protest the burning of a 
church in the southern city of Aswan the week before. The march intended to end at the Maspero 
building, the headquarters for the state-run media in Egypt, to protest the lack of coverage on the 
incident from the state-run media. Once the march reached the building, according to a firsthand 
account from one of the protesters, the military was standing in riot gear and began to attack the 
protesters.14 Military tanks also ran over many protesters and shot them using live ammunition. 
By the end of the incident, twenty-five protesters were killed from either gunshot wounds, or 
from the tanks running over their bodies. Among them was a well-known Coptic Christian 
activist, Mina Danial who participated in the January 25th uprising, and was known to advocate 
interactions between Egyptian Muslims and Egyptian Christians. The coverage by the state-run 
media, however, was contradictory. That night, it claimed that the protesters were armed and 
attacked the military and that the protesters were armed, and that the actions of the military were 
entirely in self-defense. What resulted was conflicting reports coming out about the incident, and 
                                                          
14 Mosireen. "The Maspero Massacre | 9/10/11 | What Really Happened," Maspero, Eyewitness account of the Maspero Massacre, Web, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=00t-0NEwc3E. 
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large discrepancies between the account of what Egyptian protesters claimed, what the state 
news agency claimed, and what the American news claimed.  
 
Egyptian media coverage 
The Egyptian, non-state sponsored media covered this incident as a massacre against 
protesters with little emphasis on the religious affiliations of the protesters marching to Maspero. 
Egypt Independent portrayed this incident as one that highlighted the brutality of the military 
against the Egyptian population as a whole, rather than against the Coptic Christian population 
alone. For example, one of the initial reports that came out from the Egypt Independent was a 
firsthand account from an Egyptian activist, Sarah Carr.15 She described the demonstrators as a 
unified group, rather than by sects always referring them as “the protesters.” Further in the report, 
she detailed the brutality by the military presence at Maspero, including APC’s running over 
protesters, and continuous gunfire. There is no mention of the religious backgrounds of the 
protesters or any sectarian language being used in the account. The account is a narrative report 
of the military attacking Egyptian protesters. In another one of the initial accounts published by 
Egypt Independent, a human rights lawyer, Khaled Ali stated, “‘the army is responsible for this 
literal atrocity’”16 Overall, Egypt Independent’s reports on the incident came across as one of the 
numerous atrocities committed by the military during this period.  
Mosireen’s account of that night was derived from first-hand sources, as the Egypt 
Independent had, as well as images and videos taken by the protesters who were at the scene 
when the military arrived at the march. The two eyewitnesses, Loubna Darwish, and Sharif 
                                                          
15 Carr, Sarah. "A firsthand account: Marching from Shubra to deaths at Maspero." Egypt Independent, October 10, 2011. 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/firsthand-account-marching-shubra-deaths-maspero (accessed April 21, 2013). 
16 Osman, Ahmed Zaki. "Army is responsible for Maspero bloodshed, says human rights lawyer." Egypt Independent, October 11, 2011. 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/army-responsible-maspero-bloodshed-says-human-rights-lawyer (accessed April 21, 2013). 
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Gaber, each gave their accounts as they recalled that day continually emphasizing that the 
military was the instigator to the clash. When describing the crowd at the protest, Darwish stated 
“… was most kids, families, older people”17 Darwish further stated as the march reached the 
Maspero building, “we found an APC running towards us, very fast. In the beginning it was just 
one … and then we found another one joining it. They were both going in zig zags, hitting 
people, running them over back and forth about four times.” Gaber then elaborated on how the 
state-sponsored news network of Egypt, housed within the Maspero building, issued a report 
saying the protesters were the instigators of the clash and encouraged viewers to assist the army 
in helping to quell the demonstration. Both these eyewitnesses conclude that the violence was 
instigated by the army, not from within the protest, and each does not mentions religious 
background as a factor in the violence. This is telling of how the independent media aimed to 
represent Egyptians as a whole, nationalistic entity. In another one of their clips on Youtube, 
Mosireen also put out raw footage of what happened that night, which depicted military tanks 
running through the crowd of protesters and soldiers from on top of the tanks.18 These clear and 
vivid images, constructed chronologically give both Egyptian and foreign viewers a solid 
impression that the military was entirely responsible for beginning the violence, and that they 
clearly tried to violently stop a peaceful group of protesters from reaching the Maspero building. 
That following May, seven months after the incident happened, Egypt Independent issued 
another report last May titled, “State TV admits to incitement during October Maspero 
violence.”19 This report confirms that the Egyptian state news allegedly incited viewers to assist 
                                                          
17 Mosireen. "The Maspero Massacre | 9/10/11 | What Really Happened," Maspero, Eyewitness account of the Maspero Massacre, Web, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=00t-0NEwc3E. 
18 Carr, Sarah, "Blood at Night, Grief by Day | Maspero 9/10," Maspero, Eyewitness account of the Maspero Massacre, Web, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mh5F0ot_p3s. 
19 Al Masry al Youm. "State TV admits to incitement during October Maspero violence." Egypt Independent, May 15, 2012. 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/state-tv-admits-incitement-during-october-maspero-violence (accessed April 21, 2013). 
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the military against the protesters. We can conclude from these several reports from independent 
sources that the Egyptians who took part or supported this protest, did not view the movement as 
a sectarian. Most importantly, they do not view the violent clash that happened at the end of the 
march as one instigated by religious based violence. 
In The Daily News Egypt, the same account of what happened and similar views were 
reported, in that the protesters were portrayed as a group of Muslims and Christians marching for 
a national cause. Firsthand accounts were also used from the protesters present at the march. 
Darwish was cited again in the reports and included quotes from other activists who were present. 
Notably, in one of their original reports, it was stated “Omar Tarek, an activist and journalist, 
told DNE that the Coptic cause is the same as the Muslim cause. ‘You can’t demolish a house of 
worship,’ he said, ‘if someone told me they would demolish a mosque I would react the same 
way … I am here as an Egyptian, supporting an Egyptian cause.’”20 The reports also included 
other quotes by activists sharing the same sentiment of the protesters being a group of mixed 
Muslims and Christians focused on national interests. Sectarian interests are not seen, or at the 
very least, not emphasized in the reports by the Daily News, or the previously mentioned 
independent publications and outlets.  
Overall, from what can be extracted from these reports of the massacre from these several 
independent sources in Egypt is firstly, the Egyptian military instigated the attack by attempting 
to disperse the march with armed vehicles. Secondly, the group of protesters is largely defined as 
Egyptian protesters, rather than simply Coptic protesters. Thirdly, the state-sponsored television 
incited viewers and average civilians to take part in the clash with the military, which brought 
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across this conflict as one between civilians. These details, regardless of which news source they 
are derived from, remain consistent and give the reader enough context to understand the 
background and purpose of the protesters that day, as well as how they identify themselves as a 
unified group. Through this one can get a grasp important trends in the mainstream American 
news when determining which reports carry Orientalist representations of Egyptians. One can 
know which traits to look for in American coverage that may convey dangerous, generalizing 
images of this incident and the people involved. 
 
American broadcast media coverage: CNN 
Unlike the Egyptian independent media, the American mainstream media seemed to be 
uncertain, and at times contradictory when reporting what happened on October 9th, 2011 in front 
of the Maspero building. Even within the same news report, the articles or news anchors would 
make contradicting statements. For example, the beginning of the report would directly call the 
incident a sectarian clash between Egyptian Christians and Muslims, and later in the report, the 
anchor would say the massacre was instigated by security forces attempting to quell the protest. 
There is subtle yet visible framing of the news report as being sectarian in the incident’s causes 
and ultimately, paints the report with Orientalist connotations.  
CNN in particular was one of the outlets that put forth contradictory reports that included 
language that is familiar to what was used during the time of the Iranian revolution. On the CNN 
Newsroom report dated on October 10th, 2011, the anchor gave mixed views as to whether the 
massacre was one based in sectarianism, or one based in deeper problems with the ruling security 
forces: 
 
They felt targeted ever since the Arab Spring really. And that really escalated about a 
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week ago when a church, a Christian church, was burned down, and it all erupted really 
on Sunday … The "Arab News" is saying Copts, troops in deadly clashes. As Egypt 
undergoes a chaotic power transition and security vacuum in t he wake of this year's 
uprising, Christians are particularly worried about the increasing show of power by ultra-
continental Muslims. "Daily Telegraph" though saying under its headlines, sectarianism 
will only get worse in Egypt. The army has inherited all the vices of Mubarak rule 
without any of the certainties of permanent or all-pervasive control.”21 
 
This singular report is perhaps the prime example of these kinds of problems Edward Said wrote 
in Orientalism and which continue to persist in coverage of the Middle East. The wording, 
sources, and generalizations made here are similar to how the region was reported in 1979. The 
first statement in this passage comments on how tension towards Copts has been an escalating 
phenomenon leading up to this incident. However, in terms of details as to what that tension 
entailed, what incidents happened that fostered this tension, and how this all culminated into this 
massacre is not delved into for accuracy. It’s also important to note that how the Copts have been 
targeted, and who has been targeting them is left unclear here. An American viewer can conclude 
that Copts were not only being targeted by security forces or the government, but also by average 
non-Coptic Egyptians. Though there is no direct mention of this here, the ambiguity insinuates at 
the possibility of the perpetrators of this incident and even the ones responsible for persecution 
against Copts since the January uprising as non-Copts, in this case, Egyptian Muslims. The 
anchor gave a simplistic and Orientalist representation of this situation precisely from the lack of 
detail that is given, detail far less than was given by the Egyptian media. 
Furthermore, the international publications selected were from no sort of Egyptian media 
source, but included a British based paper, and a Saudi based paper, owned by a member of the 
Saudi royal family, Turki bin Salman Al Saud. Each of these sources give ambiguous statements 
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on “ultra conservative Muslims” being responsible for beginning the massacre. In the brief 
statement given from the Arab News paper, the clash is painted in a sectarian light more directly 
here as it is stated that “Christians” are concerned at the “show of power” by “ultra-continental 
Muslims.” There is no further clarification on who the “ultra-continental Muslims” are, and 
whether they are members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafist movement or other Islamist 
groups who may or may not be associated with the ruling SCAF at this time. The “show of 
power” mentioned is also not elaborated. This potentially can leave one to conclude that these 
ultra conservative Muslims perpetrated the incident itself. In the portion from the Telegraph, 
though it is implied that security forces were abusive through the comparison with Mubarak, the 
emphasis on sectarianism again, further gives the viewer the impression of even stronger 
sectarian tensions between Muslims and Christians. The wording of each of the sources though 
brief, draws instances of generalizations that Said indicates as Orientalist in Covering Islam.22 
The involvement of “ultra-conservative Muslims” becomes the context of the incident and it is 
implied in this clip that these Muslims committed the massacre.  The inclusion of religious labels, 
“Muslim” labels here is a replacement for providing context. Overall, this frames the report as an 
Orientalist representation. The vagueness allows for viewers to fill in their own presumptions 
about what happened, which may likely lead to making dangerous generalizations about the 
Muslims involved in the incident, and even Egyptian Muslims as a whole. 
Again, it is important to note that no Egyptian independent news sources were mentioned 
in this report, another parallel with the Iranian coverage as Said mentioned. During the Iranian 
Revolution, it was stated in Covering Islam regarding the coverage of the hostage crisis that,  
“No expert, media personality, government official seemed to wonder what might have 
happened if a small fraction of the time spent on isolating, dramatizing, covering the 
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unlawful embassy seizure and the hostage return has been spent on exposing oppression 
and brutality in the ex-shah’s regime.”23  
 
Said makes this statement with the intention of posing a question about American coverage of 
the hostage crisis. He stated that if indeed there was time on mainstream news coverage devoted 
to covering why the Iranians who took part or supported the embassy takeover. This kind of 
analysis would provide context for the incident and would have shown that there are deeper 
circumstances behind the embassy takeover, that those involved did not take such action simply 
because of religious conviction or mere anger towards the United States. 
One of the most common discrepancies that emerged with the coverage of this incident 
was about the vague nature of the portrayal of the clash itself. The greatest indicator of 
Orientalist representation here is the use of Islam and Muslims. In the brief clip provided from 
Arab news, the conflict comes across as a sign of increasing tension between Egyptian Muslims 
and Egyptian Christians without going into very much detail. The very last sentence of that clip, 
gives a confusing image to viewers in that it paints what happened as sectarian motivated. There 
is also no mentioning of the security forces that attempted to disperse the march violently as the 
Egyptian media reported. While some may argue that to point at the use of sectarian language is 
unfair given the understandable background behind the march, it is clear that there is simply not 
enough context here for an audience foreign to the political circumstances in Egypt for a viewer 
to draw that conclusion.  
On The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer, during the exchange with CNN’s Cairo 
correspondent at that time, Ben Wedeman stated that the march was “ … planned, publicly 
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announced, a large march of Christians. But also, Egyptian Muslims in solidarity,”24 and further 
stated that,  
“According to the eyewitnesses, several military vehicles drove madly into the crowds, 
killing at least 17 people, as many as 25. And of course this sparked a whole night of 
street battles in several parts of the Egyptian capitol. The government is [accusing] some 
Christian protesters of attacking military vehicles, taking weapons and shooting some of 
the soldiers.”25  
 
This account stands out from the previous CNN accounts in that it differs in the amount of detail 
and also seems to follow closely with how the Egyptian media reported this event. Also, it is 
worth noting that the protesters in this report, though identified by their religious backgrounds, 
are portrayed as a group of mixed Muslims and Christians protesting against what they perceive 
to be injustice perpetrated from the governing military junta. The details mirror what we 
previously saw in the Egyptian news reports. The fact that it is stated that military drove their 
armored vehicles into the crowd, killed about twenty-five protesters, and subsequently released a 
botched narrative of the events gives just enough detail to give viewers a clear picture of what 
happened, but also portrayed the event similarly to how Egyptian independent media did. The 
most troubling aspect about this report is the contradictory statements regarding which group of 
people were attacking the Christian protesters.  The headline of the story regarding the Maspero 
incident is “Coptic Christians and Muslims Clash Violently in Egypt.” The ambiguous headline 
reflects the recurring problem within American broadcast media of oversimplifying and 
insinuating sectarian tension. The headline can lead one to insinuate that the military was 
attacking the protesters simply because of the fact that they are Christians, and it makes the 
military look as if it was motivated based on Islamic ideals. It leads one to question, whether the 
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American media continues to view Middle Easterners (Egyptians in this case) primarily as 
simply just people motivated by religious identity. While this report does indeed make the 
distinction that the protest included both Muslims and Christians, and that security forces were 
the ones who clashed with the protesters, what the viewer is supposed to derive from the report is 
unclear. As Said put it in Covering Islam, “Such statements tell us a bare minimum of what 
something is, as opposed to all other things. On this level we can distinguish an apple and an 
orange (as we might distinguish between a Muslim and a Christian) only to the extent we know 
they are different fruit.”26 
 
Broadcast Media: Fox News 
More conservative American news outlets also put forth a similar, and a somewhat 
exaggerated representation of this clash being a sectarian motivated one, again with emphasis on 
the religious identities of the parties involved. In the case of Fox News this is no different. One of 
the initial reports that came out on America’s Newsroom, prefaced the incident as a part of a “… 
continued violence against Coptic Christians in Egypt. The leaders of that group are blaming the 
military for not doing enough to protect them.”27 There are several aspects to this statement that 
are problematic. Firstly, the incident was covered as a part of a string of violent events against 
Coptic Christians, however these events were never elaborated on. Also, unlike the Egyptian 
account of the incident, the wording of how the security forces were “not doing enough to 
protect them [Coptic Christians]”28 The undertones in this statement give the impression that 
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security forces were not instigators or actively attacking the protesters as was stated in the 
Egyptian media, but rather they were trying to protect the Christians from Muslim attackers but 
were incompetent in doing so. The report narrated the sequence of events that night, which was 
perhaps the point of this report that was most concerning. 
The order in which the events were reported here are one of the essential aspects that 
make this report Orientalist in how it presented this massacre as a civilian clash with the military 
failing to stop the clashes. The first images that were shown were street clashes between different 
groups of plain clothed protesters, one would assume, Egyptian Muslims and Egyptian Christians. 
Then the similar images of the military tanks and APCs running through the crowds that were 
also shown in Egyptian coverage followed. However this sequence so far presents several 
problems. This can potentially make the viewer think that the military was coerced into doing so 
because the clashes that were shown prior to this image, were getting out of hand. Not only does 
this insinuate that the military allegedly appeared to attempt to quell the clashes, but also that the 
clashes were started between Muslim civilians and Christian civilians. This further implies of 
high sectarian tension in Egypt at this time. 
The lack of adequate context on the treatment of Coptic Christians in Egypt in relation to 
the massacre in this report is troubling. As the report progressed it was stated that, “Coptic 
Christians have always been under threat, but enjoyed protection from former President Hosni 
Mubarak. Since Mubarak’s resignation, violence has increased, with reports of Muslim gangs 
raping Coptic women with impunity.”29 This statement adds onto the already problematic report 
by emphasizing immense sectarian tension while providing little to no context. This implies to 
the viewer that the former government, before the Arab Spring protected Christians and enjoyed 
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rights under Mubarak. This makes unclear what kind of rights Christians had previous to the 
interim government, and also disregards the various government restrictions on Christians that 
have reportedly happened under Mubarak’s government. Most importantly, this suggests that the 
changes were happening from the Arab Spring up to this point were detrimental, especially to 
Christians. The constant use of religious adjectives here without solid premise is concerning. The 
strongest statement made in this report however, is the “ … reports of Muslim gangs raping 
Coptic women.” Again no context, no statistics, and no further information were given on why 
this was allegedly happening at the time. Also the fact that it this was included in a report that 
was about a violently quelled protest frames the report further to be one about strong tensions 
between Muslims and Christians, or even Muslims vilifying Christians. 
As the report continued, even more intense sectarian and generalizing rhetoric was used. 
“The overwhelming military response used against the Christian protesters now, and the tacit 
approval of a violent mob that stormed the Israeli embassy in Cairo last month, shows a 
government scared of hard-line Muslim elements within the country.”30 The very high-reaching 
and arguably absurd conclusion here embodies many aspects of Orientalist representation that 
Said stated in his work. This is a classic example of the use of “Islam” as a tangible concept thar 
can be replaced for meaningful context. No possible political or social causes were drawn in this 
clip, but rather a persistent blaming on “hard-line Muslims” and the fear of such Muslims in the 
interim period. When Islam is mentioned, “ … you eliminate political complications like 
democracy … and secularism, and you eliminate moral restraint.”31 There is no elaboration on 
how the clashes began. 
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In further reports, the references and implicit blaming of Islam for the incident become 
more overt. For example in a report on the same news program the following day, October 11th 
2011, there are similar connotations here when they are prefaced by another, unrelated story in 
Iran of a Christian pastor who was set to be executed for his refusing to convert to Islam.32 The 
stories of the Maspero Massacre and the Iranian Christian pastor being held for execution, were 
told together in the same four-minute report. This by itself is misleading in that it can lead 
viewers to think that there is a widespread phenomenon of Christian persecution. The conjoined 
reporting here also diminishes the fact that different nations, with different political and social 
circumstances were involved here. Even the religious aspect that tied these two stories together 
in this report is misleading, as Egypt at this point was a secular government governed by a 
military junta, and Iran was (and continues to be) a theocratic government based on the Shi’a 
sect of Islam. These differences are completely overlooked here and instead, the report continued 
with John Bolton speaking about Iran’s  “complete lack of religious toleration,”33 while a side 
graphic comes on the screen, stating various incidents on Christians in Egypt in the last two 
years. This aspect directly parallels the use of Islam in the coverage of the Iranian revolution as a 
term that eliminates the need for context, and a term that replaces national identity. Both these 
aspects make this report Orientalist in nature, the same kind of representations that were seen in 
the coverage of Iran as the revolution there happened. 
Overall, the aspects of this short news clip by Fox News make the coverage of this event 
not only contradictory to the Egyptian media’s account of the incident, but is joined in the 
reporting of other atrocities against Christians whether they are events that happened within 
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Egypt, or a nation that is geographically and metaphorically speaking, as far as Iran. The 
characteristics of this report, though like CNN’s reporting, indirect, carry heavy Orientalist 
connotations. The use of broad, religious adjectives, the undermining of national identity, as well 
as including other, unrelated incidents that have to do with religious persecution in their 
reporting are all examples of Orientalist representations that were typical during the Iranian 
revolution. 
 
Print Media: The New York Times 
We see a different pattern in the news coverage when looking at print media. One may 
associate broadcast news media as being sensationalist, and restricted to covering the news in 
time-limited sound bytes. There is a visible shift in how the Maspero incident was covered 
particularly in more high-brow print publications, such as The New York Times and The Wall 
Street Journal. In the New York Times coverage of the incident the language used to narrate what 
happened and the representation of the protesters was much more complex and similar to how 
the Egyptian independent media told the story of what happened. In one of the initial reports put 
out by the New York Times, the headline was “Church Protests in Cairo Turn Deadly.” It is worth 
noting here that unlike the previously mentioned broadcast media headlines, there is no comment 
on the groups of people involved, but rather on the event itself. Journalist, David Kirkpatrick 
stated in the article that the march was a “sectarian protest appeared to catch fire because it was 
aimed squarely at the military council that has ruled Egypt since the revolution.” The 
terminology with regards to sectarianism here, however, differs from previously mentioned 
examples. The disparity here is that he is not referring to a large monolithic group of “Muslims” 
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against “Christians.” The article delves into the intricacies of each group of Muslims involved in 
the incident, much unlike the broadcast media coverage of this event. 
Kirkpatrick included quotes both from Christian and Muslim eyewitnesses at the event, 
their accounts on what happened, and how they identify themselves with respect to this incident 
and as Egyptian nationals. Quotes from these eyewitnesses not only all point to security forces as 
instigators of the violence, but also express a solidarity and fellowship with the protesters 
regardless of religious background. In one instance in the article a liberal Muslim protester 
reacted to the violence by saying “‘Muslims get what is happening,’ she said. The military, she 
said, was ‘trying to start a civil war.’”34  Furthermore, when reporting on the environment 
several chants from various groups of protests that resulted as a reaction to the violence were 
quoted. Among them, were “The people want to bring down the field marshal,” “Muslims and 
Christians are one hand,” and among the crowds supporting the military, composed of Islamists 
and military loyalists, “The people want to bring down the Christians.”35 There is a clear 
showing of different voices reacting to the atrocity of that night within the Egyptian Muslim 
community. This kind of reporting makes a clear distinction between the Muslims who supported 
the Copts and the protesters’ cause in the march. These groups are not simply painted as “the 
Muslims,” but as individualized people with different opinions and human voices. This is very 
much unlike the coverage of the Iranian revolution in which “ … the American consumer of 
news was given a sustained diet of information about a people, a culture, a religion – really no 
more than a poorly defined and badly misunderstood abstraction … represented as militant, 
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dangerous …”36 Due to such factors, it is undeniable that Orientalist representation with regard 
to this incident in The New York Times is essentially nonexistent. 
Overall with regard to The New York Times, there was much deeper context put into the 
report and a visible presence of Egyptians who participated or witnessed in the event. This 
demonstrates a clear shift away from the use of generalizing terms, and can be used as a heavy 
marker of the changes happening in terms of Orientalist representation, and frequent it is being 
used in American news. The key indicator of this is the differentiation between different groups 
of Muslims in the article. There is a clear line drawn between the more liberal Muslims who 
participated in the march that night, or supported the cause of the march that was heavily 
attended by Copts, and the more conservative Islamists who saw the event as a provocation 
against the military and political stability in Egypt at the time. The slogans being chanted are 
huge indicators of how diverse the group of protesters were. The exploration of the nuances of 
the groups involved in this incident by itself shows the complexity of this particular situation, 
and the complexity of the state that the country was in. This kind of representation does not 
imply anarchy, but rather a kind of instability that happened due to corrupt forces at work, and 
was done with the intention of perhaps not only instilling fear in a religious minority group in the 
country, but to weaken the opposition movement against the interim government. 
 
Print Coverage: The Wall Street Journal 
Despite its much more conservative stance on domestic issue when comparing it to The 
New York Times, The Wall Street Journal’s coverage of the Maspero Massacre is similarly less 
Orientalist in its representation of the Maspero Massacre. In the initial coverage of the massacre, 
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there is a clear narrative, a clear statement of how security force were involved, and a showing of 
varying voices and opinions within the Muslim community in Egypt The headline, “Clashes 
Between Christians, Police Rock Cairo” unlike other examples we have seen do not give this 
incident an Orientalist framing, but rather frames it as a clash between security forces and 
civilians. It is important to note here that, as we have seen in previous instances, the headline of 
the story was prefaced by coverage of the clashes that happened after the massacre took place.  
When looking at the beginning of the article, reminiscent elements of CNN’s coverage 
are present, as the massacre is called “ … one of the worst incidents of sectarian violence since a 
revolution in February toppled Egypt’s former regime.”37 There is already a subtle framing of 
the incident as a massacre fueled by civilian Christians and civilian Muslims. The further 
coverage of the reactionary clashes feeds into this notion. The clashes were described as 
“communal tensions,” that were suspected to be started by “a law enforcement void.” Even with 
the framing of this incident as a sectarian based one, it was implied that such tension was not 
long standing when it was stated, “Egyptians have long prided themselves on a shared 
citizenship that straddles religious boundaries.”38 There was not enough context given in the 
beginning of the article, and no smooth narrative for readers to have solid footing on how events 
progressed that night. There is at least a visible recognition of varying voices, opinions and 
differences within Egyptian society, and more importantly, among Egyptian Muslims. 
Despite the original report stating that the incident was one of sectarian violence, 
different voices conveyed that show diversity within the Egyptian Muslim community. For 
example it was stated, “‘People are burning churches!” said Nasser Abdel Mohsen, a Muslim 
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who said he had joined the Christian protesters out of solidarity. ‘That’s never happened before. 
We always used to live peacefully as Copts and Muslims.’”39 This man further said, “‘It’s a 
stupid thing that the army is coordinating with the thugs and Salafis … these are the people who 
want to burn down the country.’” 40 In addition we see another point of view from an Egyptian 
Muslim who did not support the protesters, and stated “Christians were to blame for both the 
violence in Cairo and the church attacks in Egypt.”41 At the same time, this report put forth 
another point of view. “Mohammed Abdullah … said he witnessed the violence, about 3000 
Christian youth attacked the military with sticks and Molotov cocktails … Mr. Abdullah said 
Christians were to blame for both the violence in Cairo and the church attacks in Upper 
Egypt.”42 Abdullah further stated regarding the cause of the march itself that, “‘It was against the 
law. They were building their church on land that belonged to a guesthouse.’”43 Even with the 
characterizing of the massacre as one based in sectarian tension, the showing of different 
opinions among Egyptian Muslims ultimately shows recognition of different political factors 
were at play in how this massacre was handled. Further in the article, these various groups and 
sectors in Egyptian society were directly stated, and a clear difference was made between 
Islamists and the secular and liberal Egyptian Muslims who supported the cause of the Coptic 
Christians in the march. “Egypt’s political ferment has ushered in a powerful contingent of 
Muslims who adhere to the Salafi fundamentalist school of Islamic thought … their rapid ascent 
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to the political mainstream has alarmed liberal Egyptians and religious minorities.”44 By stating 
that these groups exist, implies that while this is allegedly an incident of sectarian violence, by 
no means does it automatically become defined as a simple conflict between all Muslims and all 
Christians in the country. This not only paints an idea for the viewer that the incident was not a 
black-and-white clash of religious sectarianism, but gives the idea that such incidents are not 
long-standing, but are due to the increasing political presence of the Islamists. 
While this is certainly a move away from typical Orientalist representation, there were 
aspects about this article that were included, and also excluded that could potentially give the 
reader a less of an Orientalist framing of the incident. Unlike in the representations the Egyptian 
media put forth, there is no direct indication of the military violently quelling the original march. 
It is stated, “Soldiers charged the protesters with armored cars, running over several people 
… ”45 only after it was stated that clashes occurred. Overall however, despite The Wall Street 
Journal’s shortcomings in failing to provide a concrete narrative in how the events at Maspero 
unfolded and became violent, there is undoubtedly a shift away from using generalizing terms in 
the groups involved in the incident, and even those that simply have an opinion on what 
happened. The use of generalizing terms was one of Said’s most significant criteria in look at 
Orientalist representation, and in this aspect, there is progress being shown. This conveys a 
promising view in humanizing the Egyptians, in what otherwise may have been, a black-and-
white, Muslim vs. Christian clash that would have been seemingly typical to the region. 
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Conclusion 
 Though each of these outlets give different reports to varying extents, there is a clear 
shift towards providing concrete political context and humanizing the protesters. This is clear in 
how detailed the incident was portrayed and the different groups of Egyptians involved in it are 
portrayed. Print media provided a better sense of what exactly happened the night of the Maspero 
Massacre, and a clear picture of how various groups of Muslims thought and reacted to the 
incident. With the broadcast outlets, there was a stronger Orientalist framing by both the 
headlines that used generalizing, black and white terms, and in the case of Fox News, grouping 
incidents of Muslim extremism throughout the Middle East together in the same report. It is 
interesting to note, that we see more similarities among print publications and broadcast media 
that we do on outlets who purport a liberal view as opposed to a conservative view of the news. 
Next as we examine the massacre that occurred only a few months later after this one in a Port 
Said football stadium, a similar pattern of what types of outlets provide sufficient context to give 
the viewers and readers and understanding of how the incident unfolded will emerge, along with 
the political complexities surrounding the massacre. What is different here, however, is that this 
incident puts forth the notion of sectarian violence of another kind. Instead of religion, football 
fan rivalries, and hooliganism are at question, and like the Maspero Massacre, there is a strong 
need for a concrete narrative of the incident. Again, we will find this to be dangerously lacking 
in broadcast news outlets, but clear in print outlets. Though there will be apparent traits that 
humanize the news story, such as clear political context, vagueness and a proclivity to portray 




CHAPTER TWO: The Port Said Football Massacre 
Background 
This particular incident happened at Port Said on the night of February 2nd, 2012. It 
continues to be a sensitive one for Egyptians as many questions are left unanswered on how such 
violence erupted in the stadium, and why there was no security to prevent such an incident from 
happening. This incident is perhaps one of the starkest examples of how the American 
mainstream media covered this event in a vastly different fashion from that of the Egyptian 
independent press. The event started as a regular soccer match between the Al-Ahly team, the 
team with the largest fan base in Egypt based in Cairo, and the Al-Masry team, another well-
known team based in Port Said. The Al-Ahly fan club, often referred to as the “Al Ahly Ultras” 
in Egypt, took a very active role in the January 25th uprising, and had continually been joining in 
various marches and strikes against abuses by the then-rulers of Egypt, the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces (SCAF) under the banner of the Ultras. The Ultras continue to claim that the 
massacre was a planned conspiracy to incite sectarian conflict among football fans with in Egypt, 
and to tarnish the image of the Ultras as playing a politically active role in the uprising.  
 
Egyptian media coverage 
Mosireen’s coverage of the incident took place the day after the events, between Port 
Said where the massacre took place, and in the Cairo train station where returning Al Ahly Ultras 
were returning from the match. Eyewitnesses and lawyers of the injured and families of the 
victims commented on the nature of the incident as a possible planned and conspiratorial event to 
foster civil strife. Outside thugs came into the stadium with arms and came in to the stadium as 
fans of the Al Masry team. Those interviewed from both the Al Ahly Ultras and the Al Masry 
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Ultras further insinuated that because of the activity of security forces while in the stadium. One 
lawyer who was present at the aftermath of the incident stated, “One of the eyewitnesses … said, 
and I quote ‘I went on the filed after the match with a group of spectators to celebrate. Some of 
the fans carried Hossam Hassan46 and we were shocked to find a uniformed police colonel 
telling us, ‘Go kill those bastards.’”47 Another Al Masry fan who was interviewed testified the 
scene after the match finished before the massacre, “We took to the field … and we wanted to 
check it out, posed for pictures … No one saw these massive surges coming. We ran into Central 
Security Forces on our way and they were cursing and telling us to go attack the fans.”48 The 
image that was shown from the incident in their video was fans attempting to run out of the 
stadium and security forces in riot gear standing in the field. From these accounts there is a clear 
view among the eyewitnesses that the security forces did not only take on the responsibility of 
stopping the thugs that were claimed to have begun the massacre, but also encouraged other Al 
Masry fans to join these thugs. Regardless of whether this was a premeditated attack, what we 
can take from this is that there is a view among Egyptians who follow the independent media 
that security forces went beyond simply neglecting their duty. According to the activists behind 
Mosireen this incident is one that is telling of deeply corrupt security forces, not hooliganism 
among football fan clubs. 
In other eyewitness accounts from Mosireen, eyewitnesses commented on the unusual 
aspects of the match even before the massacre began. The usually tight security checks that 
happen to each fan entering the stadium was allegedly not done before this match. An eyewitness 
stated, “It’s never happened in an Egyptian club. They are extra careful about security. They 
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confiscate lighters!” Another group of fans stated, “We came in and went out without tickets. No 
one checked our tickets.”49 What it is important to note is how much context is given around the 
event. The emphasis on the strange and suspicious activity both during the match and afterwards, 
suggests that the incident was not instigated by angry football fans and not a case of simple 
neglect from security forces. 
In Egypt Independent, the massacre was similarly covered with the use of fans in the 
stadium at the time. They also drew their sources on what happened from Port Said residents. In 
one of their original published articles, the first statement announced, “Port Said residents are 
adamant that the violence at Wednesday’s football match here was caused by infiltrators, not 
hardcore local football fans.” 50 In a quote from one of the Al Masry fans in the article, it was 
further stated, “They pointed out that the gate between the stands and the pitch was left open, 
while at the same time the exit to the area where Ahly fans were sitting was kept closed.”51 This 
reflects the similar view that the context behind what happened at the match to Mosireen’s 
account that the causes run much deeper than idle security forces, and in this case directly stating 
that this incident was a possible conspiracy against the Al Ahly Ultras. Furthermore in the article, 
an NGO worker for the Arab Network for Human Rights Information stated, “the SCAF has 
been working to sow division among Egyptians, stressing that the military council is the 
principal beneficiary of the current events.”52 In addition to Mosireen’s coverage, there was more 
coverage given to the possible causes of the event, and even possible motives by security forces 
and the ruling military council. Again this shows the kind of portrayal that Egypt Independent 
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purported about this event. In this view, it was a tragic event that the security forces and military 
were to blame for, and that it was a possible conspiracy against the pro-opposition Al Ahly 
Ultras.  
In an opinion article that was published the day after the massacre there is some insight 
on what kind of larger social and political factors could have contributed to the violence. The 
contributor, Fayrouz Karawya argued that the immense failure and corruption of security in the 
stadium was not an isolated event. She stated that the security vacuum had been a recurring 
problem not only since the January 25th uprising, but even since 1999 when an assassination 
attempt against ousted President Mubarak happened in the city. Since then she said, “ … there 
was a systematic policy to ruin the city … Port Said’s economy sank following the alleged 
assassination attempt due to state policies that aimed to end the city’s status as a duty-free zone.  
This has left many unemployed; some have been forced to make a living off of being paid thugs 
for state security.”53 The fact that Port Said was a duty-free zone made its economy a functioning 
one. Without it, the city suffered and continues to suffer, Karawya argued. As was seen in 
Mosireen’s coverage, there is no mention of fan rivalries or any of the root causes of this incident 
being from such rivalries. In the coverage of this incident, Egypt Independent purported a great 
deal of speculation on the security forces’ failings in the stadium, the possibility that they may 
have been using this event to foster tension and divisions among average Egyptians, and the 
deeper problems within the Port Said itself that may have lent itself to contributing to this 
massacre. The use of eyewitnesses and NGO workers as sources for providing the narrative of 
the event and analyzing the context and causes conveys the image of the fans in the stadium that 
night as the victims and the security forces, as the perpetrators. 
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 In the Daily News Egypt, we again see similar narrative of suspicious police activity in 
the stadium at Port Said. Keeping in mind again that this publication is meant for the English-
speaking reader with non-Egyptian contributors, there are some additional points here that were 
not found in Mosireen’s or Egypt Independent’s coverage. For example, in their original article 
of the event published February 2nd 2012, the morning after it happened it was stated, “For the 
ultras, as for many politicians and ordinary Egyptians, the anger was not that soccer fans clashed 
but that security forces appeared to have done little to stop them. It has added to the mounting 
frustration at the army’s failure to restore law and order almost a year after taking charge.”54 It is 
added here that the frustration against security forces are not shared only among the Ultras and 
those involved in the incident, but among other sectors of Egyptian society. This implies that the 
view of the incident was a suspicious one primarily caused by the idle activity of security forces 
is a widely held one among Egyptians, rather than it being an event that was caused from a 
rivalry between the Al Ahly and the Al Masry Ultras. Also, we see here unlike the previously 
mentioned publications that a prominent political figure was quoted for his input on this incident. 
The then-presidential candidate who was running as a liberal commented in the article, "What 
happened was black vengeance against the Ultras because of their role in the revolution."55 
Again, it is important to remember the active role the Al Ahly Ultras have played since the 
January 25th uprising. Their early involvement in the movement, and their continual participation 
in demonstrations against police and military brutality as a group, made them one of the leading 
voices of the opposition and synonymous with the image of revolutionary youth in Egypt. It is 
for this reason that the inactivity by the security forces at the incident is construed as an attack on 
the ideals and values for what Egyptians call the January 25th Revolution. The tragedy that 
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happened in Port Said that night for Egyptians was seen as an indicator of the incompetence and 
perhaps corruption of the security forces and the SCAF (Supreme Council of Armed Forces) in 
ruling the country after the end of the uprising.  
Overall, what we can derive from news sources in Egypt is that it runs much deeper than 
tensions between soccer team fans, and even neglect on the part of the security forces present at 
the incident. There are larger complexities to the causes of this incident that have not yet been 
identified, with corrupt factors at play. The amount of context and speculation of what factors 
were behind the massacre is the major aspect of this coverage that gives readers and viewers the 
best sense of how Egyptians see this event, and how they portray the Ultras of both the Al Ahly 
and the Al Masry teams as the victims of this tragedy, rather than as two groups fighting each 
other or the perpetrators of the incident. 
 
American media coverage: CNN 
One of the most prevalent and consistent aspects in the coverage of the Port Said Football 
massacre is how the event overall was portrayed. Broadcast outlets as well as some print outlets 
characterized this as a “riot.” This was one of the most common keywords used in the coverage 
of the Iranian revolution according to Said, and is one of the indicators of Orientalist 
representations. In this case, there is a subtle framing of this incident being driven by the 
opposing fan clubs. The involvement of security forces were conveyed as secondary in the 
unfolding of the massacre. These factors together paint the incident as a clash between two 
groups of fans. 
The first aspect of CNN’s coverage is that the incident was depicted in the headline of the 
initial report as a “riot.” On the CNN Newsroom, the headlines that came up regarding the 
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incident on the day it happened, February 2nd 2011, were: “Egypt’s Soccer Riot Fuels Concerns,” 
“79 Killed in Egypt Soccer Riot,” and “More Anger Flares After Soccer Riot in Egypt,” The very 
first report that day was prefaced by the anchor, Kyra Phillips, with the question, “Well, politics 
or just passionate soccer fans?” The implication made here with “passionate soccer fans,” and 
the headline calling the incident a “riot” here could lead American viewers to believe that the 
incident was simply a fan rivalry gone wrong. This reinforces the original Orientalist 
representation of Middle Easterners being impulsive and irrational enough to partake in a riot 
over a football match and kill dozens of people. The difference here is that it is never directly 
mentioned that these soccer fans were killing each other over the results of the match. However 
the language used implies a kind of mass hooliganism and mob activity that is typical of 
Orientalist representation. In this case with the CNN Newsroom, this is only insinuated. As the 
report continued, it covered the demonstrations in Tahrir Square that took place in reaction to the 
incident rather than the incident itself. It is covered as a smaller factor to a broader pattern 
happening in Egypt, the increasing discontent from the Egyptian public on the SCAF’s interim 
rule. Not considering the headline, this news story could have provided a brief but insightful 
report on the condition of Egypt’s security and governance and shown how this incident was a 
symptom of the failings of the SCAF as a governing force. However, implying that the incident 
was only a result of security being unable to stop fans of opposing teams from clashing could 
give the viewer the impression that these soccer fans resorted to barbarism. As was apparent with 
the coverage of the Maspero incident, there was insufficient context on the massacre itself to 
avoid viewers taking away that that the incident was a result of what happens when a stable 
government falls and when football fans in Egypt become passionate about how the results of a 
match turn out. 
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On The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer, the coverage of the incident was direct about 
the incident being caused from angry fan club rivalries, thus portraying it as a clash between fans. 
The report of the massacre was first prefaced with the release of kidnapped American tourists 
and the alleged increasing dangers on the streets of Egypt. It was stated, “Two American tourists 
kidnapped in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula were, in fact, freed today … Abductions 
and daylight robberies are becoming increasingly common in Egypt.”56 What came across as an 
isolated incident involving American tourists seems to turn to a broad statement that implies that 
such incidents are rampant. No other context is given to the “abductions and daylight robberies” 
that were “increasingly common.” This paints Egypt as a country nearly uninhabitable to 
American viewers. Putting these statements right before covering the massacre potentially gives 
the viewer an impression that Egypt was under a state of anarchy at the time this report was 
issued. 
After this statement, the report progressed with beginning to cover the protest in Tahrir 
Square that took place in reaction to the violence at the Port Said stadium. The focus here was on 
the various chaotic incidents and protests that were happening in and around Tahrir Square at 
this time. Cairo correspondent, Ben Wedemen stated on the show, “ … on the roads leading to 
the interior ministry, there are still clashes. In fact, there was a fire at the Egyptian tax 
authority.”57 Furthermore, Wedemen continued to state what happened at Port Said, “ … is much 
more than just sports.”58 However, rather than elaborate on this, there continued to be more 
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coverage on the protest and clashes in Tahrir Square and the chaos that is happening due to 
discontent with the government, and perhaps more specifically, the SCAF. 
Firsthand accounts were given in short and almost cut-off statements. For example, an 
Egyptian man interviewed gave his opinion on both the incident and the resulting protests. “‘I 
hate football,’ … ‘but those innocent boys have made Egyptians sympathize with them because 
they're our children.’”59 It is interesting to note that there is an indication of context behind the 
incident here since the man quoted sees the fans as “innocent,” however again, this is not 
followed up by any other additional context. 
The report restated the tension within the country over the Port Said incident and perhaps 
other government failings as insinuated in this report. This is most evident as the report comes to 
a conclusion with, “A year after the revolution, the culture of protest and clashes with the 
authorities has become deeply embedded in Egypt … despite the fact there's an elected 
parliament, this is the way many Egyptians like to work out their politics.”60 This statement 
gives a depiction of a large, angry, and even irrational crowd, a depiction of a common 
Orientalist view of Arabs. 
 
Broadcast Media Coverage: Fox News 
With Fox News, there was similar rhetoric of the mob-mentality at play as the cause of 
the massacre. Their initial headline in covering the incident on the program, The Fox Report, was 
“Egyptians Deal with Soccer Riot Aftermath.”61 When the report itself began, the anchor Shep 
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Smith began by saying, “A day after the soccer riot that left dozens dead, outraged Egyptians are 
responding with more violence.”62 This statement by itself, when considering the preceding 
headline and the stated statistic of seventy-five dead fans from the incident, this statement could 
make the viewer think that those “outraged Egyptians” were displaying the same kind of 
violence that killed the fans in the stadium. As the report continued, the anchor stated the nature 
of the reactionary protests and clashes with the police and how the protesters believe that 
security forces were responsible for the massacre in the stadium. He continued, “Witnesses say 
fans of one team cornered the fans of the rivals, attacking them with stones, clubs and knives.”63 
Again the minimal and fragmented eyewitness accounts and context here further purports the 
image of the massacre being started from something as simple as fans of one team provoking 
another.  
However, despite this suspicions in the role of security were further explored as the 
report continued when the anchor referred to the correspondent. The correspondent said, “The 
violence was planned for several days and the police was complicit in it.”64 It was further stated 
that it was believed that the police helped the fans of the winning team enter the stadium with 
weapons, and the police let the violence happen. It’s important to note here that unlike 
Mosireen’s report of the incident, it was not thugs, but the fans themselves who were responsible 
for killing the fans of the opposing team, painting this as a black-and-white fan rivalry gone awry. 
After this statement however, political reasoning is given as to why those fans, and as 
correspondent later calls them, the “Ultras,” and their involvement in the January 25th uprising. 
                                                          
62 "Egyptians deal with soccer riot aftermath." Fox News Video Archive Recorded February 02 2012. Fox News. Web, 
http://video.foxnews.com/v/1430285758001/egyptians-deal-with-soccer-riot-aftermath/. 
63 "Egyptians deal with soccer riot aftermath." Fox News Video Archive Recorded February 02 2012. Fox News. Web, 
http://video.foxnews.com/v/1430285758001/egyptians-deal-with-soccer-riot-aftermath/. 
64 "Egyptians deal with soccer riot aftermath." Fox News Video Archive Recorded February 02 2012. Fox News. Web, 
http://video.foxnews.com/v/1430285758001/egyptians-deal-with-soccer-riot-aftermath/. 
 46 
However, even when considering the amount of context given on what the fans stated about the 
conditions in the stadium at the time, the prefacing of this story with characterizations of the 
protesters as outraged and violent alters the viewer’s perception of the story and downplays the 
significance of the security forces in perpetrating the massacre. This could be viewed as a story 
of what happens when Egyptians become passionate over football, or how things such as mob-
mentality and murder could be becoming commonplace with the former regime out of power. 
One could easily see the fans involved in the incident as hooligans, and willing to murder over 
something as trivial as football team loyalties`. 
Overall, with Fox News’ coverage, the framing of the story to reflect mob-like behavior 
and intense passion over football loyalties make these aspects building blocks to a story with 
Orientalist connotations. What can be considered promising about the news story is that context 
was given as to why the incident happened, and that the role of security forces was made 
essential in painting this incident as one that was instigated by outside factors, not simply fan 
club loyalties. This aspect demonstrates a subtle shift away from the Orientalist notion that 
Middle Easterners, Egyptians in this case, are compelled by irrational urges and passions. 
 
Print Coverage: The New York Times  
Unlike the pattern with the Maspero Massacre, The New York Times coverage of the 
incident shared similarities with how CNN covered the tragedy at Port Said. The headline of 
their initial article covering the incident was “In Clashes with Police, Egyptians Unleash Fury 
over Soccer Riot Deaths.”65  Though the headline sounds similar to the headlines from CNN, the 
type of context put in the article gives the incident depth. The article began by covering the 
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protests in Tahrir that were in reaction to the event and subsequently went on to cover what 
happened that night in the Port Said stadium. While Kirkpatrick here stated how violent the 
incident turned out to be, there was significant focus on the circumstances around the massacre, 
who the fan clubs were, the odd occurrences that happened that night, and huge question of what 
the security forces were or were not doing. 
“Rumors that the police had deliberately abetted the violence at the match on Wednesday 
circulated through the crowd but were impossible to confirm. Protesters charged that the 
police had neglected to search fans for weapons, or had opened gates for the Port Said 
fans while closing them on the Cairo contingent or had turned out the lights to give the 
home fans cover.”66 
 
While not confirming the truth of the police deliberately escalating the attack and encouraging 
fans to join the attackers, Kirkpatrick acknowledged this as one of the potential instigators of the 
violence. Also, unlike either of the broadcast outlets we examined, the odd conditions 
surrounding the match, such as there being no ticket attendants, no security checks upon entering 
the stadium, and stadium lights suddenly turning off at the end of the match were made clear. 
This also conveyed that Kirkpatrick was using firsthand accounts from fans who attended the 
match. This insinuates that the massacre may not have resulted from simple incompetence by 
security forces, but rather from their active participation in the massacre.  
As the article progressed, there was less of a focus on the protests that were occurring at 
the time, and more of a focus on the casualties, and immediate steps that the SCAF and local 
government in Port Said took to investigate the perpetrators. There was also detailed background 
given on who the Al Ahly Ultras are and what their role was in the January 25th uprising as well 
as anti-SCAF demonstrations that followed throughout that year. The article included rumors 
from the Ultras who stated  “ …  the Interior Ministry meant to retaliate against the Cairo soccer 
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fans because of their leading role in several violent battles with the police at protests over the 
past three months.”67 These statements made throughout the article mirror the Egyptian coverage 
of this event as it again showed how much more complicated the circumstances behind the match 
were. This shows that there are deep problems with security forces in the country, and that the 
incident is not only a “riot” of angry soccer fans with rivalries. It is implied that there were 
corrupt forces at work with regards to this incident. What is important to note here is that there 
were many unconfirmed statements about what happened in the stadium, what security forces 
were doing, and whether the attack was at all premeditated, this article stated how these accounts 
from protesters differed due to the fact that they showed how complicated the incident was and 
how it was a symbol of problems with the SCAF. They also showed the continuing problem of 
corruption, especially when it comes to the safety of civilians. 
 
Print Coverage: The Wall Street Journal 
In The Wall Street Journal, we see similar traits in the style of reporting as we did in the 
reporting of the Maspero Massacre. Different groups of Egyptians, whether they are football fans 
from either team, security forces, politicians or activists, all had an acknowledged presence in the 
investigation of the incident and were all given voices in terms of who was to blame for the 
massacre, and how the events unfolded that night. There are elements in this article that make the 
incident come across as an attack in which Al Masry fans attacked Al Ahly fans, however the 
covering of the reactions of politicians, lawmakers, and activists give enough of a political 
context to show that the massacre was a result of political complications rather than a brawl over 
the results of a football match. 
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The article began by prefacing the coverage of the incident itself with coverage of 
reactionary protest that took place in front of the Interior Ministry in Cairo. The article also 
included brief coverage of the parliament’s unruly emergency session over the incident. Quotes 
from parliamentary members, liberal activists, as well as eyewitnesses at the football stadium 
were stated either directly or indirectly in the article, all expressing their resentment towards the 
security forces. This preface and the emphasis on the attempted actions by the parliament to 
investigate what happened at the stadium show that the incident was more than a skirmish 
between fan rivalries. The article stated the circumstances behind the incident are complex, as at 
this time, the country was going through was a “ … shaky postrevolutionary transition.”68 It is 
implied that the incident was a manifestation of the instability in the country, and the strong 
possibility that corrupt influences were at work in the causes of the massacre. The shortcoming 
of this article from an Orientalist perspective is that it stated “Thousands of Al Masry supporters 
invaded the Al Ahly bleachers and tossed fans from the nine-meter-high stands.”69 This phrasing 
makes it seem as though all Al Masry fans took part in the massacre. There is no distinction 
between the fans and the thugs who participated. This wording has the potential to make this 
sound like the fans were indeed acting on exaggerated and impassioned fan rivalries. 
Despite this, here is a strong emphasis throughout the article of the shortcomings of the 
security forces in how devastating the massacre turned out. Statements from eyewitnesses that 
the police “ … had abetted the bloody events of Wednesday night”70 are made clear and even 
restated. In another statement that reflected the opinion of activists, “ … liberal political parties 
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that are more closely aligned with Egypt’s street-level protest movement aimed their barbs at the 
ruling military council.”71 Again these different views reflect the extent to which this incident is 
not only difficult to investigate and draw conclusions from, but also how complex the political 
situation on the grassroots level is between average Egyptians and the police.  One of the final 
statements in the article directly reflected what eyewitnesses in Mosireen’s account continually 
implied by the strange circumstances of that night. “In a confusing move that many activists say 
proves an orchestrated police conspiracy, guards at the match closed the exit gates to the Port 
Said stadium, penning in escaping fans …”72 The conclusion of the article, similar to the Egypt 
Independent article discussed earlier, gave an insight on the significance of this incident, and 
what it symbolizes for Egyptians. It was stated: “‘The average Egyptian is extremely 
disappointed, seeing this as another chapter in this history of the collapse of Egypt’s police 
forces.’”73 This quote from a political science professor gave a voice for average Egyptians in 
this article. The use of direct quotes from eyewitnesses shows a strong move away from typical 
Orientalist representation. The presence of different voices, such as politicians, college 
professors, eyewitnesses, and activists all of whom were native Egyptians gives this incident a 
strongly realistic and human impression to American readers. When considering these traits in 
the article, we can see a huge leap from the typical generalization that Orientalist representations 
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Conclusion 
Overall, with CNN’s and Fox News’ coverage, the framing of the story to reflect mob-like 
behavior and intense passion over football loyalties make these aspects building blocks to a story 
with Orientalist connotations. What can be considered promising about their is that context was 
given as to why the incident happened, and that the role of security forces was made essential in 
painting this incident as one that was instigated by outside factors, not simply fan club loyalties. 
This aspect demonstrates a subtle shift away from the Orientalist notion that Middle Easterners, 
Egyptians in this case, are compelled by irrational urges and passions. There is a different pattern 
with the Times and the Journal in that a narrative is constructed from the voices of the 
eyewitnesses and Port Said residents who were present at the stadium. From this narrative, the 
involvement of the security forces, and suspicious circumstances are made clear, indicating this 
to be an incident larger than just fan rivalries. It is made clear as a massacre made possible from 












CHAPTER THREE: Mohammed Morsi’s Election to the Presidency 
Background 
Mohammed Morsi’s election to the presidency was an unforeseen one given several 
circumstances. The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) a party founded by members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, after Hosni Mubarak’s ouster in 2011 stated that they would not be running a 
candidate for president when the time came to run elections. In the first parliamentary elections 
in November 2011 months after the SCAF came to power, an overwhelming amount of Islamists 
ran for seats. Members of the FJP won over 70% of the seats in parliament and the remaining 
seats were held by Salafists and a small number of left-wing liberals. Nearly a year later, after 
the first parliamentary elections in November 2011 in which they gained the majority of the 
parliamentary seats, and presidential elections were announced to be held in May 2012, the 
Muslim Brotherhood announced that they would be running Khairat al Shater, a leading figure of 
the Brotherhood for President. Omar Suleiman, the Vice-President under Hosni Mubarak, and 
considered by many Egyptians to be one of the most corrupt officials of the Mubarak regime, 
also ran for president. These two candidates stirred concerns among the liberal opposition 
movement. Despite the running of other liberal and big-name candidates such as liberal Nasserist, 
Hamdeen Sabahi, former head of the Arab League Amr Moussa, among others, calls to boycott 
the elections were made. After complications with the judicial system, Shater was deemed 
legally unfit to run for President and the FJP put Mohammed Morsi as their candidate for the 
presidency. This appeared to many in Egypt as if Morsi was simply a back-up candidate rather 
than someone who was a confident, first choice to propel the Brotherhood’s ideology in political 
office. When this occurred in March 2012, there was already an increasing divide occurring 
between liberal camps and the Islamist camps. 
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Egyptian Coverage 
The first presidential election drew various types of coverage and analysis from various 
newspapers and broadcast networks. This was largely because of the increasing gap between the 
Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood supporters, and the liberal and secularist bases in the country, 
on the other. However, since this was the first democratic election of a head-of-state in Egyptian 
history, there was widespread optimism for two reasons. One is that it was perceived to be the 
first democratic election and second because Ahmed Shafiq, the last man to serve as Prime 
Minister under Hosni Mubarak’s reign lost to Morsi in the final run-off. As Morsi’s rule began, 
the rift between those who supported the Brotherhood, and those who did not only increased. 
Mosireen, as a grassroots news outlet did not cover the election itself, however it covered what 
came about from the point of view of the working class and activists who opposed the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s policies because of their actions as members of parliament. Though they did not 
cover this event directly, it is still essential to analyze their coverage of the indirect outcome of 
the election. 
Mosireen put up reports and raw footage of protesters in Tahrir Square before and after 
Morsi’s election which expressed an extreme discontent with the Brotherhood’s alliance with the 
military. It was portrayed as implicit support for continuing military trials against civilians and 
other atrocities that liberal groups claimed to be rampant at the time. In addition, they posted 
several videos of worker’s strikes that began due to low wages, extreme and hazardous working 
conditions, and verbal abuse by company directors. There was also footage posted of neglected 
but functioning public hospitals that were severely lacking in resources, and could not adequately 
provide care for Egyptians who could not afford to seek care elsewhere. These videos were all 
filmed during the time in which the Brotherhood-majority parliament was in session, and during 
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and after the presidential elections. Though Mosireen did not publically and directly denounce 
Morsi and the Brotherhood until months after the election when the new constitution was being 
drafted, these informational videos show the inadequacy of the ruling government, and how the 
status quo remained even after an allegedly stable government was put into place.74 
In Egypt Independent, there was a similar tone of discontent toward Morsi and the 
Brotherhood. In the days leading up to the election, there were several articles published on the 
discontent about the primary election results that turned out Morsi and Shafiq as the front-
runners. In one such article published the day after the election primary, results were announced 
in which Shafiq and Morsi won, it was stated “‘The election was rigged,’ claimed Assem Ali of 
the April 6 Youth Movement, adding that they came to protest as individuals and not as members 
of political movements or parties.” 75 In another instance, it was stated that there were “… 
several irregularities, notably lack of access in the final aggregation of national results.”76 This 
indicates that the elections were not as free and fair as they were promised to be, according to the 
article. On the day that it was officially announced that Morsi won the presidency there was a 
comprehensive listing of voting statistics published. These showed that most of Morsi’s votes 
came from various cities and towns in Upper Egypt and rural areas on the Nile Delta, indicating 
that many of Morsi’s voters may have been people who may not have had accessible information 
to the other presidential candidates, or voters who were illiterate. Overall, the problems with the 
elections portrayed in the Egypt Independent showed a deeply critical view of Morsi. 
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In Daily News Egypt, there were similarly negative representations of Morsi’s rise to 
power. In one of the articles published on the day election results were announced, it was 
emphasized that Morsi won about 51% of the vote as opposed to his opponent, Ahmed Shafiq 
who won 48%, hardly a large majority win. In an article published the week prior to the 
announcement, it was stated that due to disenchantment about the elections, the severe lack of 
information about the candidates, and other problems contributed to the low turnout. 77 The 
article narrated one illiterate man’s struggle to vote. “ … his confidence in choosing was further 
challenged by his illiteracy. He struggled to find his name in the registration list, he wasn’t able 
to write his voter ID number … was only sure of the candidate he finally decided upon by their 
symbol.”78 This shows how inaccessible the elections were to a significant portion of the 
population given Egypt’s 88% literacy rate among men and 82% literacy rate among women.79 
Even the enthusiasm according to the article was quite low, with only 15% turnout among those 
eligible to vote in the primary election. This paints the elections as a failed attempt at fulfilling 
the demand for fair and accessible government, and highlights the wide opportunity for corrupt 
and illegal practices to take advantage of illiterate voters. This in turn, delegitimized Morsi and 
gave reader skepticism on what his actions would be as president. 
Overall what we can gather from the information from these Egyptian sources is that 
Morsi was an unpopular candidate from a liberal standpoint, and more importantly, there were 
many inherent problems with the elections that likely had many voters confused, and unable to 
make an informed vote. The confusion among these voters, as one can infer, allowed opportunity 
for corruption and illegal practices among hard-line supporters for any candidate. Whether it was 
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his affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood or the legitimacy of the elections, we can conclude 
in regards to the secular and liberal point of view among Egyptians, that Morsi’s election was 
problematic. 
In regards to how the American mainstream broadcast and print media covered Morsi’s 
election, there are several promising aspects that show a shift away from older and typical 
Orientalist representations. We can parallel this event, an Islamist head-of-state coming to power 
with the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini to power after Iran’s revolution. There are many signs of 
progress in use of language and depictions about Morsei as an Islamist, and Egyptian voters. 
Instead of perceiving him as a threat, there was a tone of optimism and even excitement as 
witnessing the first of such elections in Egypt after the January 25th uprising. As we saw in the 
previous case studies, we will see an exploration of the nuances in Egyptian public opinion 
regarding Morsi’s election. 
 
Broadcast Coverage: CNN 
In CNN’s coverage of Morsi’s election, there was excitement and optimism exuded in the 
initially reports of his victory. There was a heavy focus on the celebrating crowds in Tahrir 
Square, and on the historical significance of the election, that it was the first democratic election 
in Egypt’s history. On CNN Newsroom on June 24th 2012, the day of the official announcement 
that Mohammed Morsi had won the presidency, there was a positive tone regarding the results, 
and event an exuberance in reporting on the historical significance of the election and the 
growing celebratory crowds in Tahrir Square. The report began with a tone of excitement on 
Morsi’s election. The anchor, Fredricka Whitfield, referred to the Cairo correspondent Ben 
Wedemen who was present in Tahrir Square for the celebration of Morsi’s victory. Wedemen 
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noted the exuberant crowd in the square, the cool weather, and the significance of his victory. He 
stated, “The only time I'd heard louder roars was … when Mubarak resigned … this definitely is 
a landmark day for Egypt, the first time in more than 7,000 years when the people were … able 
to elect democratically their leader”80 Interestingly, during the reporting of this announcement, 
there was only minimal mentioning of Morsi’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, or 
speculation on how an Islamist dominated executive and legislative government would affect 
American interests, much less, be considered a threat. The only speculative moment, though 
brief, in the report is whether Morsi would keep true to his stated promises of maintaining 
equality among various sectors of Egyptian society.  
Additionally, there was coverage on the fact that Morsi was indeed not a widely popular 
candidate among voters. This is very much unlike typical Orientalist representations of how 
Ayatollah Khomeini was viewed among ordinary Iranians. At the time of the revolution, the 
media portrayed the rise of an Islamist government as something akin to being doomed to 
savagery and backwardness. In fact, a phrase often used when referring to the revolution at the 
time in the news media was that Iran “fell” to “Islam,” as if it were a physical entity. In this case 
however, the opposite seemed to be conveyed. The Egyptians were seen to have varying 
opinions across a wide spectrum of political affiliations. Wedemen continued,  
“ … if you look at numbers … Only 50 percent of the electorate turned out and 
Mohammed Morsi only won 52 percent of that … somewhere between 25 percent 
and 26 percent of those Egyptians eligible to vote actually voted for him. And 
many Egyptians were unhappy with the choice that they were given in the second 
round.”81   
 
This quote when considering typical Orientalist representation is meaningful in determining not 
only how much support Morsi had and even the Brotherhood had among the voting population, 
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but this is also an important recognition on the part of CNN that he was by no means a popular 
selection for president. The statistics put forth help the viewer understand exactly how much of 
the voting population, much less the wider Egyptian population actually favors Morsi. 
Additionally, the direct quotes from the voting population construct a comprehensive portrait of 
the varying opinions among Egyptians. For example, Wedemen stated, “I know one Egyptian 
who told me that he would vote in this election, but he would do it wearing surgical gloves and 
holding his nose because he didn't like the choices that were being presented.”82 The inclusion of 
this quote serves two functions here in straying from typical Orientalist representation. It shows 
the amount of differences in opinion among Egyptians that even with two run-off candidates, 
there were a significant number of voters who did not at all favor Morsi or Shafiq for the 
presidency. The disuse of generalizing terms here when it comes to how favored Morsi really is 
among the general public is another sign of a clear shift away from typical Orientalist 
representation that may paint the entire Egyptian public as a group that would favor Islamist rule. 
Despite this and considering his background with the Brotherhood however, when 
covering Morsi’s comments and there is an unusually positive highlighting of his progressive 
values. It was stated that “… all Egyptians, men or women, have the same rights. And the other 
day he did say … when choosing his vice president, he would be considering people outside of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. He said he might choose a woman”83 It was even stated that he would 
consider selecting Coptic Christians or those from liberal parties on his cabinet. When 
considering the image that is portrayed of Morsi as an Islamist and Brotherhood member, as 
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opposed to the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, we see a significant shift in how an Islamist head-of-
state coming to power is viewed by American media. We see considerably less attention on the 
fact that Morsi was the candidate backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, and even a portrayal of 
Morsi as a possible progressive leader who may bring secular values into his rule. Also, Egyptian 
voters were not characterized as one monolithic entity with one opinion. All these traits signify a 
moving away from the Orientalist representation of 1979, which would have characterized this 
incident as a threat to the United States perpetuated by Islamist leaders and a monotonous group 
of voters who would blindly choose such a leader. 
In terms of stating American interests in this significant election, there was also minimal 
emphasis in this initial report put on how the United States would be affected by his election. 
The focus in this piece was how Morsi’s election would affect Egyptians, and their goals to 
establish a fair government in the post-Mubarak era. This report did not cover how this story 
relates to American interests, but had a focus on breaking down the Egyptian voting population 
to various groups who favored, and disfavored Morsi as a presidential candidate. What is 
arguably most important in the coverage of the election in this report is the portrayal of Morsi 
himself. Even as a man with Islamist convictions, he was presented as a man who had the 
potential to carry out progressive reforms as president. The covering of the “gray areas” with 
regards to voting Egyptians, and Morsi himself, we can call this another sign of a clear shift 
away from Orientalist representations that would have otherwise painted Morsi as a menacing 
figure as was done with Khomeini, and the Egyptians as people acting blindly towards voting for 
an Islamist candidate, as the Iranians were portrayed in their support for Khomeini. Overall, 
these points of focus in the coverage show a shift from typical Orientalist representations to 
giving humanizing portrayals of voters and of Morsi.  
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Broadcast Coverage: Fox News 
On Fox News, throughout May and June of 2012 as the first general presidential election 
and final run-off elections were taking place, there was doubt and concern over Morsi’s advances 
in the election and even over Shafiq’s advances. In a report dated May 25th 2012 on America’s 
Newsroom, there was a subtle image put forth of Egyptian voters that most either simply 
preferred an Islamist leader or going back to the old regime.  “ … [W]ho a lot of people have real 
concerns about from what he has said about Israel, or Egypt’s relationship with the United States, 
and what he has said about bringing ‘Shari’a or Islamic law to Egypt.”84 Vittert further stated 
that Ahmed Shafiq, the other frontrunner who was projected to likely face Morsi in the run-off 
election was a member of the “old guard” or the old Mubarak regime. The anchor then asked 
Vittert, “Where is their candidate? Why do they not have someone who is in a prominent 
position in this race?” Vittert answered by saying that “there is a lot more support for the 
establishment, to go back to the way things were than you saw on the street.”85 Here he was 
referring to the liberal candidates the January 25th youth supported at the time. It was stated that 
the liberal candidates “did not have the ability to get out the vote that the Muslim Brotherhood 
had,” while not elaborating exactly why or that the notion of multiple political parties was a new 
concept in Egyptian political life.86 Without these details, the overall impression the viewer 
could get from a report like this is that Egyptians simply wanted stability, or the right to choose 
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an Islamist leader with anti-American convictions. Though this statement is not as overtly made 
as it was in 1979 about the Iranians, we can interpret this as a watered-down version of saying 
that Egyptians are going to opt for a dictatorship or for Islamism with anti-American convictions. 
As for the coverage on the day the run-off election results were to be announced, the 
image purported of the event had a similar tone of emphasizing Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood 
background, the possibility of turning Egypt into a theocracy, and what kind of implicit threat his 
rule would impose on American interests in the Middle East. The first report of Morsi’s victory 
came on the Fox News’ regular news program, America’s Newsroom, and began by reiterating on 
four occasions within the first thirty seconds of the report that an “Islamist” or “Muslim 
Brotherhood” candidate had won the presidency in Egypt. Subsequent to this, the distinction 
between Brotherhood supporters who voted for Morsi and opposition supporters was made clear, 
as Rittert stated that the supporters celebrating Morsi’s victory in Tahrir Square were “mostly of 
supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood group, and the Salafists.”87 This implies recognition on 
the part of Fox News, that Mohammed Morsi was not a widely popular leader. In consequence, 
this puts forth an image of Egyptians as people who did not favor Islamists representing or ruling 
over them, an image contrary to the Orientalist view of Iranians.  
As the report progressed, it offered greater context on Morsi’s background as an Islamist, 
his educational background in the United States as an engineer, and as a political prisoner under 
ousted president, Mubarak’s regime for his involvement with the Brotherhood. Though not as 
detailed as the Times, or as the Egyptian independent media sources, the amount of context 
presented can be enough to give viewers the impression that the Egyptian voters did not 
unanimously support Morsi in these election, and as a consequence, did not support the 
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Brotherhood taking positions in government at the time. Other indications made about the 
diversity in opinion among Egyptians in this report were delving into the demographics of 
Egyptians who voted, and their thoughts on Morsi as an Islamist president. During the report, it 
was emphasized that the election was a very close one between Morsi and Shafiq, “ … less than 
two and a half percent of the country” actually voted in favor of Morsi. Rittert then elaborated on 
the concerns among the wealthy, the secular, as well as the educated sectors of Egyptian society 
that may be concerned about having an Islamist as their president of turning the country into an 
“Islamic state.”88  Though this potentially frames Morsi as a threatening figure with insufficient 
evidence, Egyptians are humanized and shown to be thinking individuals.  
Despite these promising elements of showing a detailed, contextual picture of the 
presidential election, who Morsi was as a presidential candidate, as well as how Egyptians from 
various sectors of society voted and reacted to the results, there was a consistent looming tone of 
the Brotherhood potentially turning Egypt into a state run by “Shari’a” and much speculation on 
how this election would affect American interests, and other nations, particularly Israeli interests, 
would be affected. The first subtly Orientalist element that was the continual speculation of how 
Morsi, along with the parliament elected a few months prior to the presidential election, would 
turn the country into an “Islamic state.” Without citing any of Morsi’s promises, or policies he 
claimed to have put into place if elected. Rittert mentioned concerns such as making hijab 
mandatory for women, “social democracy … all these kinds of things are now in play.” As he 
continued there were several mentions of how American interests, and even on Israeli interests 
would be threatened. During the report Rittert stated, “… the world has to redraw its power map 
with the Middle East now that the mother of the Arab world is controlled by the Muslim 
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Brotherhood.”89 These statements with their vague information presented several problems that 
could make viewers misunderstand the geographic scope in which this election would have an 
impact on, as well as how Morsi will have an impact on his constituents. For example, the 
possibility of Morsi instituting the wearing of the hijab as a mandate for women is put forth as a 
certainty, and therefore gives a false impression that instituting “Shari’a” as the law in Egypt was 
itself a certainty. There is a clear association between Islam and “Islamic” law here that appear to 
be one and the same when an Islamist comes to power. This assumption fed into the Orientalist 
notion of Islam deciding what will happen to a political system. This can be interpreted as a kind 
of context, in speculating how Islam will always be associated with establishing a form of 
Islamic law. Though this is not stated directly, viewers who were not familiar with the politics in 
Egypt at this stage can certainly assume that the election of an Islamist leader automatically 
means the coming of strict, and harsh Islamic law. 
Though this report delved into the nuances of Egyptian society, it failed to cover how 
Morsi’s proposed policies would affect them on a grassroots level, and what this meant for the 
groundbreaking movement they began almost two years prior to this election. This lack of 
attention on what this election means for Egyptians downplayed the importance of this election 
for Egyptians. Though it came across subtly, this aspect of the report is Orientalist in that it 
emphasized the importance of the election for foreign interests, rather than Egyptian interests for 
the people who would be affected by Morsi the most. The perpetual speculation of how 
American and Israeli interests, and allegedly the entire power dynamic of the region would be 
affected made Morsi come across as a threat. Despite this Orientalist portrayal, there was also a 
                                                          




promising change in how Egyptians themselves are portrayed. While not as detailed as the Times, 
Fox News still the distinctions between Islamists and secularists clear, between Brotherhood 
members and Salafists clear, and even the wealthy and educated sectors of Egyptian society. 
These statements along with statistics of the election results provided a human and realistic 
image of the Egyptian people as they continued to struggle with getting their demands for fair 
government met. 
 
Print Coverage: The New York Times 
The trend with the Times to portray individual, news-making incidents as a result of 
deeper complexities within Egyptian society in the post-uprising era, and give extensive context 
behind a given incident remains true with the coverage of Mohammed Morsi’s election to the 
presidency. Again, there is arguably no sign of Orientalist representation in the initial article 
released announcing Mohammed Morsi’s victory in the election titled, “Named Egypt’s Winner, 
Islamist Makes History.”90 We can draw a direct comparison to how the Times covered the 
Ayatollah’s installation as head of state. In one case Said cites in which The New York Times 
covered the state of Iran after it “fell” to Islamists. In the article, “ … scholars were trying to 
subdivide ‘Islam’ into its more important components whereas the Times recomposed these 
components to power wither ‘inimical’ or ‘friendly’ to United States interests.”91 The coverage 
of Iran’s transformation was juxtaposed with how their changes would affect American interests. 
A type of filtered, Orientalist lens was used in this case. However, we can be optimistic here in 
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that such a portrayal of Morsi’s election, another kind of Islamist leader over forty years later in 
Egypt. 
In the portrayal of Morsi as a public figure and president elect, there was extensive 
coverage of his educational background, his history with the Mubarak regime of being 
imprisoned, as well as his position with the Muslim Brotherhood prior to his election to the 
presidency. In this article, Morsi is portrayed as someone who is a leader who would attempt to 
instill equal rights to all Egyptians, regardless of faith, and one who would not pose a threat to 
the surrounding region, as well as the United States. Kirkpatrick included a quote from Morsi’s 
acceptance speech in the article stating, “‘We are all equal in rights, and we all have duties 
towards this homeland,’ he added. ‘But for me, I have no rights, I have only duties.’ He also 
repeated his pledge to uphold all international agreements”92 He is portrayed as a new head-of 
state who seeks to fulfill the hopes of the youth who began the January 25th uprising, rather than 
“Islamize” the country. The second part of that statement implied his willingness to abide by 
international relationships with the United States, and even with Israel given the peace treaty 
with Egypt. However, it is important to note here that he is not portrayed through the lens 
whether he would be “good” or “bad for American interests. Throughout the article, this is the 
only reference to how Morsi would deal with the United States. The remainder of the article 
focuses on what Morsi himself claimed his goals would be for the country, and an exploration of 
his own history and qualifications. 
In addition, the article continued by stating that, “Mr. Morsi resigned on Sunday from the 
Brotherhood and its political arm … He has promised that the prime minister and an advisory 
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council would come from outside the Brotherhood as part of a unity government based on a 
rebuilt alliance with liberals and other secular activists.”93 This statement in a way, detaches 
Morsi from the Brotherhood from the explicit mentioning that he has decided to resign from the 
organization itself. This potentially paints Morsi as a non-Islamist, or at least one who would not 
consider Islamist values in policy making. This implies of his intentions to form a secular 
government, with the inclusion of liberals and secularists in his government. This image of Morsi 
is an idealistic and majestic one. To American readers he comes across as one of the leaders who 
may uphold the values of the Arab Spring. This is perhaps reflective of the view on the part of 
the Times that Egypt at this point had great potential to become a self-sustaining, and fairly 
governed country on its way to developing into a modern nation. When considering this image 
alongside the image of Khomeini, we can conclude that there are no discernible aspects of 
Orientalist representation regarding Mohammed Morsi’s image as radical Islamist who intends to 
spread his ideology throughout Egypt and the surrounding region. There is minimal emphasis on 
how he would impact American foreign interests, and his quotes included in the article gives him 
the image of a “people’s leader.” His portrayal as a man attempting to rebuild a country based on 
what a popular movement demands shows a kind of humanity not only on Morsi’s part but also 
towards the Egyptians, Islamists or not, who voted for him. 
Again as we have seen in previous cases, the Times elaborated on the various 
demographic groups who were in the square celebrating the victory, whether for Morsi’s victory 
or Shafiq’s defeat. In the article Kirkpatrick quoted a young, liberal opposition activist who was 
from the April 6th Movement. “He was celebrating, he said, but not because he supported Mr. 
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Morsi. ‘I hate Ahmed Shafik,’ he said. ‘He is from the old regime.’”94 Neither of the broadcast 
outlets we explored delved in to the fact that many may have voted for or supported Morsi in the 
run-off election simply because they did not want any remnants of the old regime to hold a 
position in government, much less the presidency. This quote poses the possibility that many 
were celebrating the loss of Ahmed Shafiq, rather than Morsi’s victory. This also implicitly 
poses the question of how much support at this stage of the post-uprising era in Egypt of how 
much support the Muslim Brotherhood actually has in the country. 
The numbers of people going out to protest against Morsi and perhaps the Brotherhood 
dominance in government as well as the hundreds of thousands of protesters who reportedly 
went to Tahrir Square to celebrate Morsi’s victory shows how wide of a gap there is among 
various sectors of Egyptians, such as liberals, Islamists, Coptic Christians, and supporters of the 
military. Egyptian society again in this article is conveyed as the opposite of a monolithic group 
who chose an Islamist leader simply because they are, as Said put it, “ruled” by Islam. The 
inclusion of the fact that Morsi won only 51.7% of the votes in the run-off reaffirms the notion 
implied that Morsi was not a widely popular leader among Egyptians. The complexity behind the 
election itself and the unorganized circumstances that allowed Morsi and Shafiq to be the 
frontrunners in the run-off election allow the reader to see that the vast majority of Egyptians did 
not necessarily favor the Brotherhood or the old regime.  
Overall, the portrayal of Morsi in the Times, as well as the portrayal of the Egyptians who 
did and did not vote for him come together to form a portrait of a complex society reacting to the 
results of a historic election in a variety of ways. This is yet another example of the shift away 
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from typical Orientalist representation that may have painted this story as a popular election of 
an Islamist leader who appears to be a threat to American interests in the region. The article 
presents a humanizing representation of Mohammed Morsi and Egyptian citizens as a whole that 
demonstrates this shift. 
 
Print Coverage: The Wall Street Journal 
The Journal similarly to the previous cases, as well as to the Times coverage, conveyed 
this event as a historic one, and covered it through the lens of how his election affected both 
Egyptians and the international community. Despite their coverage being largely diluted in 
Orientalist representation as we have seen with the previous two case studies, there is some 
reason to believe in this case that there are some Orientalist aspects expressed in the article in 
how Morsi may affect foreign policy was stated. The phrasing in this article implies that Morsi 
could have proclivities to threaten American interests in the region and specifically, break ties 
with Israel. However with the portrayal of the Egyptians who voted for Morsi as well as those 
who did not, it makes clear with explicit reference to the official count of how many votes he 
received compared to his opponent, Ahmed Shafiq. In clarifying the diversity in thought among 
Egyptians, and putting Morsi’s popularity in perspective, this article shows progress away from 
the kind of Orientalist elements that were rife in coverage during the Iranian revolution. 
Nonetheless, certain statements can give the reader the impression that this election was 
more significant on an international scale than a domestic one. Within the beginning of the 
article it was stated, “The election of an Islamist introduces a moment of anxiety for secular-
 69 
minded Egyptians, Western governments and Egypt's powerful neighbors.”95 This statement 
could be interpreted in two ways. It highlights the fact that Morsi was not by any means a 
popular leader and came to power at a time when liberal opposition groups and Islamists were 
facing a growing divide. However, the inclusion of “Western governments and Egypt’s powerful 
neighbors,” more than likely meaning Israel and the Gulf states, outdoes the beginning of the 
statement in that the emphasis on the West and “powerful neighbors” makes this election an 
international issue rather than an Egyptian one. When considering this statement, there is 
inadequate focus put on the Egyptians and how this election would affect them as they were 
going through a post-uprising, interim period. This ultimately frames the article with Orientalist 
connotations, connotations that this election would be potentially threatening to not only 
American interests but interests of other countries in the region. 
The threat to the west mentioned in a more direct way than we have seen in American 
news coverage so far. It was stated, “A Morsi presidency threatens to upset a fragile U.S.-backed 
diplomatic balance. Along with the U.S., the oil-rich Gulf states helped underwrite Mr. 
Mubarak's military-backed, secular rule that safeguarded a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel 
and ensured a measure of stability in the volatile region.”96 This quote here can be easily 
construed as problematic when looking through an Orientalist lens because of the heavy focus on 
foreign interests. This is the first time in coverage of Morsi’s rise to the presidency that we see 
he is portrayed directly as “threatening” to American interests. The multiple issues brought up 
here, such as the treaty with Israel, the relationship with the Gulf states and of course the United 
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States portrayed his election to be one that would directly determine the future of the entire 
Middle East. The tone makes this passage come across to the American reader that because of 
Morsi, the entire, “volatile region” could possibly turn out to have a series of new problems. 
However it is important to note the trend of being implicit with this accusation. In Covering 
Islam, Edward Said stated that language used when covering the Middle East was often blatantly 
direct and repetitive when saying how the Middle East, especially as a region “owned” by Islam 
was a direct and extreme threat to America itself, not only its interests. One of the prime 
examples that Said cites of this is when “ … the Times published a series of four long articles by 
Flora Lewis, all attempting seriously to deal with Islam in crisis.”97 According to Said, though 
Lewis did provide context, there was no reference to religious diversity in the Middle East, and 
went so far as to call the Arabic language a “rhetorical and declamatory” language.98 Statements 
made to these extremes are not seen here. In fact, in terms of how Egyptians themselves are 
portrayed, this article the case is quite the opposite. Muslims, let along Islamists are not at the 
center of the article, but Egyptians of different political and religious affiliations are portrayed 
and given a voice regarding their views on Morsi’s election. 
Despite the ominous tone regarding how his election would change foreign relations in 
the region in a disadvantageous way, the portrayal of the people is to a certain extent comparable 
to how the Egyptian media sources portrayed them, though not as detailed as those sources or the 
Times. The Journal in this case, acknowledges their presence, and their apprehension of Morsi as 
an Islamist head-of state. This is further highlighted as the statistics from the final run-off with 
the secular contender Ahmed Shafiq winning 48.3% of the votes and Mohammed Morsi winning 
51.7% of the votes, according to the article, showing a wide gap in opinion, and the amount of 
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people who actually support the Islamists holding a position in executive government. We are 
also seeing Egyptian scholars being quoted on the election as legitimate sources for analysis, and 
what this election means for average Egyptians. It was stated by Khaled Fahmy, an Egyptian 
historian in the article that,  “‘It is a revolution against the very nature of the Arab state that is 
not accountable to its people … For the first time, we have the people in the largest Arab country 
having and dictating their say despite ferocious opposition.’”99 This quote from a native 
Egyptian scholar highlights the notion of this election being not only a historic one, but one that 
affirmed Egyptian academics are legitimate sources for information and analysis on such events. 
This is a huge shift from news coverage in 1979 when rarely, if ever, was there a native Iranian 
academic quoted to elaborate and analyze what was going on with the immense changes and 
upheaval in Iran.  
While diversity in thought is made clear, there is no mention of specific groups within the 
“secular minded” Egyptians mentioned in the article. In fact, with the way the wording is, the 
article makes it seem like officials of the former Mubarak regime and those who supported it, 
and the liberal youth who helped to begin the January 25th uprising against him. The term 
“secular minded” is used vaguely, and potentially gives readers a black and white impression of 
the demographics involved, that “secular minded” people are all one group within Egypt, 
regardless of whether they favored or were against Mubarak or the ruling military council at the 
time. Furthermore, Morsi was portrayed, as a leader to be concerned about in regards to 
American interests, and much of the article, viewed Morsi through the lens of how his rule would 
change the power dynamic in the region, and what it would mean for the United States. While 
this can be construed as lighter Orientalist elements in how this election was covered on the part 
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of the Journal, the subtly of these statements, as well as the voice of native Egyptians, and the 
clarity of how many voters actually supported Morsi in these elections demonstrate an awareness 
of how diverse Egyptians are in political thought and opinion. This in itself shows a shift away 
from a modern Orientalist representation.  
 
Conclusion 
In terms of how Islamism, particularly with an Islamist in a position of power, and how 
Egyptians as a whole perceive such a ruler coming to power, there are still solid aspects of 
Orientalist representation present in American coverage. This is particularly true since it was 
apparent that the election was covered in relation to how the result would affect foreign, 
particularly American interests, and how Islamism would take shape. The Journal and Fox News 
portrayed this as such. Interestingly, CNN seemed to cover the election with a much less 
emphasis on how it would affect foreign interests, and instead, put forth statements made by 
Morsi on what he planned to do in office, including what kind of relationship he hoped to 
establish with liberals and the Coptic Christian minority. What is interesting here is that unlike in 
the other two cases, there is more of a visible similarity in coverage in how traditionally 
conservative outlets and traditionally liberal outlets than there is in how print and broadcast 
outlets covered this election. The Journal and Fox News each focused their coverage on how 
Morsi’s election would affect the United States and nations they invested interests in the region, 
whereas CNN and the Times focused on the reactions of different demographic groups within 
Egypt at the news of Morsi’s election. With both cases, even if to different extents, there is an 
evident shift away from Orientalist representation in that in all cases, there is a recognition that 
Morsi was not at all a widely popular candidate, and that various and sizeable segments of the 
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Egyptian population had varying opinions on the election, the candidates running in it, and the 




Through these case studies, one can see the wide spectrum of representations that are 
taking shape through different forms of media and different types of incidents. It is clear that 
while many aspects of Orientalist representation remain prevalent in current day American 
mainstream press coverage, representations of Egyptians, and perhaps peoples of the greater 
Middle East are continuing to evolve. Generalizations continue to be present in mainstream 
American news coverage. There are still instances of Muslims being generalized and spoken for 
as one large and monolithic group in Egypt. However, in other aspects such as the scope, the use 
of Islam as context, and how American interests with regard to these incidents were conveyed, 
there is an obvious shift towards humanizing the subjects of the Egyptian Arab Spring. 
There have been several promising shifts that give way to less barbaric Orientalist 
representations, and perhaps a sign of American news coverage moving forward in portraying 
human concerns in their realistic context in regards to the Middle East. We are seeing Muslims 
being put into subgroups in the print media. Readers are shown that “Muslims” are not one large 
group that has monolithic beliefs, opinions, and behaviors throughout the region, let alone within 
a nation such as Egypt. We are seeing much less of an emphasis of how the outcomes of these 
cases would affect “the West,” or in a narrower sense, American foreign interests. With the 
initial reports of Mohammed Morsi’s election to the presidency there was nearly no mentioning 
of how a head-of-state with deep involvement with the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood would 
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affect American foreign policy in the Middle East, or pose a threat to American interests. Overall, 
across news mediums and news outlets within those mediums specifically for broadcast media, 
shifts appear to be sporadic. It is clear however from close examinations of these case studies 
and the news coverage of these exhibits that common generalizations in Orientalist 
representation are at least beginning to be less frequent. 
 
Geographic/Ideological Scope 
In geographic and ideological scope, there is a visible difference in the progress made 
between mainstream print publications and mainstream broadcast news outlets. With the 
broadcast outlets, Fox News and CNN, the massacre was painted as a simple Muslim against 
Christian conflict. Many details were stated in a different order than in the Egyptian sources, 
which made the incident appear as if it was started by civilians in a clash, in which the military 
attempted to quell violently. In turn, the parties involved in the incidents were conveyed in a 
black-and-white manner. However, there was recognition that the incident was an issue that 
stemmed from Egyptian political strife. In the case of Fox News, the story was conjointly 
reported with other incidents of “Muslim extremism” that were completely unrelated to the 
march in Egypt. This purports the view of “Muslims” regardless of national identity or other 
distinctions are all a monolithic group. 
Despite the still-rampant, even if more subtle generalizations of Muslims in broadcast 
media coverage of the massacre, there are evident leaps away from typical Orientalist 
generalizations when examining the print media coverage. One of the most striking shifts we saw 
when looking at the print coverage, of the Maspero Massacre was the delving into various groups 
and sectors within the Egyptian Muslim community. Especially with The New York Times, the 
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coverage succeed in acknowledging the distinctions between Islamist Muslims, liberal Muslims, 
Muslims who supported the cause of the march that night and Muslims who did not. These 
nuances demonstrate a clear break away from the Orientalist notion that would categorize 
Egyptian Muslims into one large, monolithic sector of Egyptian society. 
The other case study we examined in which we saw the ideological scope narrowing with 
how Egyptian Muslims, their roles, and their opinions being portrayed through a realistic lens in 
both print and broadcast media was the election of Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood 
member, as the first democratically elected president. In nearly all the news outlets explored, 
there was common recognition that Mohammed Morsi, the Islamist president-elect at the time, 
was not a widely popular choice for Egyptian voters and that the Muslim Brotherhood was an 
unpopular organization among various sectors of Egyptian society at the time. In all outlets, 
Morsi’s narrow win, and the low voting turnout was all covered and implied as possible 
contributors to Morsi’s win. The portrayal of Egyptian Muslims as a whole being in favor of a 
leader from the Muslim Brotherhood, and being in favor of Islamist rule in Egypt is not present, 
as was the case during the Iranian revolution. This coverage shows a promising shift away from 
generalizing the people out of the election results. The coverage also did not portray Islamism 
being a widespread phenomenon as a result of the Arab Spring, and made no outside associations 
with Egypt. The narrow geographic scope based on national identity, and an even narrower scope 
on religious and political terminology here shows promise in the news media beginning to disuse 
language that may be construed as Orientalist. 
When considering the considerable lessening use of generalization when it comes to 
differentiating between Egyptian Muslims, and in some cases Middle Eastern Muslims in general, 
much progress has been made in exploring the nuances in demography within these groups. 
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When looking at the similarities between the Egyptian media coverage and American coverage, 
print in particular, we can safely conclude that American media outlets are at least beginning to 
move away from using Orientalist images in their coverage, and are beginning to cover incidents 
in Egypt in a humanistic light, recognizing nuances and differences among groups of people 
within the country. 
 
“Islam” as Context 
Another trend to take note of in each of these cases, particularly with the Maspero 
Massacre is the use of Islam as an ideology or general behavior of Muslims as the rooted causes 
to an incident. One of the largest trends with coverage of the Iranian Revolution as Said stated 
was that, “Muslims … react only because it is historically, and perhaps genetically, determined 
that the should do so; what they react to are not policies or actions … What they are fighting on 
behalf of is an irrational hatred of the secular”100 Though we have seen hints of this in Fox News 
coverage, and arguably in CNN’s coverage, there is a much more considerable shift away from 
using Islam as the context for the case studies covered in this project. With the Times and the 
Journal, political and social context to all three of the incidents were given. In the case of the 
Times, extensive context was given to explain the Maspero Massacre, the Port Said Massacre, 
and Morsi’s election. In these cases, it was the only news outlet to give such extensive 
background on the groups of people involved in each incident, and using eyewitness information 
as sources to give such context. 
With coverage of the Maspero Massacre, the Times out of the four mainstream outlets 
explored gave the best context in that the nature of the protest was thoroughly explained by 
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giving a brief history of the church demolition in Aswan, and indicated that it was not merely a 
protest of Coptic Christians, but also of Muslims who supported their cause and denounced the 
church demolitions that was believed to have been carried out by the military council. Even in 
the aftermath, the many slogans among the Coptic and supporting Muslim protesters make clear 
that from their point of view, the military had instigated the massacre by attempting to violently 
quell the march. The account given by the Times was almost identical to the one given by 
Egyptian independent media. As a result, readers were able to visualize chronologically what 
happened, and to be able to see that the conflict was not merely a sectarian one, but rather as one 
that was possibly instigated by security forces, aiming at a crowd of protesters, rather than a 
crowd of Christians. The use of Islam or extremist Muslims was not cited as a cause, but the 
tension and relationship between liberal opposition groups consisting of Muslims and Christians 
and the ruling military council was emphasized.  Similarly in The Wall Street Journal, though a 
clear, chronological narrative of the incident was not apparent in the initial coverage, there was a 
thorough depiction of the groups of people involved, including Islamists who supported the 
military, secular Muslims who supported the Christians. The inclusion of active and native 
Egyptian voices in the coverage gives the reader an understanding of the complex circumstances 
surrounding the massacre.  For this reason, the coverage does not generalize the massacre, but 
gives context of Egyptian public opinion, and shows the diversity in opinion among Egyptian 
Muslims. In both sources it is made clear that there is suspicious activity on the part of the 
security forces, not inherent Muslim erraticism that is cited as the cause. This detailed showing is 
a shift towards realistic representation of such incidents in Egypt. 
We can clearly see a promising move away from slapping the label of Islam onto these 
incidents to cite it as one of the root causes to these incidents. With the Port Said massacre, all 
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news outlets showed recognition that the incident had confusing and suspicious circumstances 
surrounding the condition of the stadium as well as the idleness of the security forces in the 
stadium.  In addition, especially with the Times, the presence of active, eyewitness voices were 
also present here with the statements made by some that the police actively participated in 
carrying out the massacre. Though these statements might seem conspiratorial to American 
readers, the inclusion of such statements shows that the incident was not simply a matter of one 
fan club being angry at one another. Other factors, even if they were unknown, were at play in 
the instigation of the massacre. Irrational and impulsive behavior that were associative traits in 
Muslims according to Said, are downplayed in favor of substantial concerns of corruption at the 
backdrop of the massacre. 
The use of political and social factors as context in American coverage is also evident in 
the coverage of Morsi’s presidential election. With the Journal’s detailed statistics, and the 
Times’ it was made apparent that Morsi was elected not simply because of his popularity or the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity. In fact, it was made clear in all outlets that Morsi’s win was 
very narrow and that voter turnout was very low. What is essential to understand in the coverage 
with not only print, but the broadcast outlets as well was that Morsi was not painted as a copy of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, a menacing Islamist leader who hates the West and aims to spread 
Islamism throughout the region. On CNN and the Times, he could be construed as a social, even 
secular leader with his quotations on establishing an inclusive and equal society alongside liberal 
opposition supporters and Coptic Christians. Morsi was at worst portrayed as an influential 
figure, one who could determine the future of the region in terms of Egypt’s relationship with 
Israel, the United States, and the Gulf states. There is an incredible shift in how an Islamist head 
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of state is portrayed in contemporary US media. Instead of menacing, Morsi was conveyed to 
show some promise for the post-uprising Egypt. 
 
Prevalence of American Interests  
One of the promising things about the news coverage in nearly all the outlets explored 
here is the lack of presence of the self-absorbed mentality on the part of the media, of: “how will 
this affect us?” particularly with the election of Mohammed Morsi as president. With The New 
York Times, these questions were virtually nonexistent in the coverage. Instead, there was a 
heavy focus on the election results themselves, and what the reactions of Morsi’s victory were 
among his supporters, liberal opposition groups, and other sectors of Egyptian society. The focus 
was clearly on the Egyptians involved in the election and how they would be affected by the 
elections. American interests in Egypt were only covered in reference, and no in nearly much 
detail as the election itself, the reaction of Egyptians, and what possible domestic policies Morsi 
would carry out according to his acceptance speech. This kind of coverage emphasizes the 
importance of covering Egyptian public opinion and how significant event that happen 
domestically may affect them. 
There is a very promising shift from portraying this event through a Western lens in 
particular with contemporary media. The Maspero Massacre and the Port Said Football riots 
were each heavily traumatic incidents in Egypt and affected political discourse in terms of how 
the security forces and police. Many saw these incidents as indicative of the political instability 
within Egypt. However despite this, there was no speculation or over-exaggeration of how 
influential these incidents are on an international scale, and no fears of how this instability may 
translate into strained relations with the United States or Israel. In this aspect, domestic incidents 
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in Egypt are treated purely as internal concerns, and therefore are telling of an acknowledgement 
that average Egyptians are the focus of these stories. This focus humanizes them in the eyes of 
American news consumers and allowed for the capacity to empathize with them. In 
contemporary news there is a visible increase in this kind of coverage, another sign of a shift 
away from viewing these incidents through an Orientalist lens. 
 
Continuities in Modern Orientalist Representations 
 Among one of the most prevalent consistencies with regards to Orientalist 
representations of Egypt, the depiction mob mentality and riotous behavior continue to be 
present, even if in subtler ways. This is particularly true with broadcast media. In the original 
thesis, Orientalism, this is one of the base criteria in Orientalist depictions. According to Said 
there is, “No individuality, no personal characteristics or experiences. Most of the pictures 
represent mass rage and misery or irrational … gestures” within older and typical Orientalist 
depictions.101 With the broadcast coverage of the Port Said Football Massacre and with the 
Maspero Massacre, this was present. Unlike the Egyptian coverage and even the print coverage 
of the incident, there were no personal testimonies, no narrative as to what the course of events 
were or why such large crowds were protesting, setting government offices on fire, or even 
detailed reasons as to why the fans in the stadium and the protesters supporting them were angry 
at security. In the coverage from CNN and Fox News in particular, the video shown in each were 
of groups of people clashing with inadequate context given behind these clashes. The use of 
generalizing representation continues, and as we saw with Fox News, has the power to shape a 
news story in a completely different light than what eyewitnesses claim what happened. 
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In the coverage of the Port Said Massacre, there was an apparent disregard for the use of 
eyewitness accounts of what happened in the stadium during the incident, particularly from CNN. 
This lack of context framed the incident as one that was catalyzed by hooliganism, from one 
group of football fans being angered at the opposing group of fans. Political context was 
introduced eventually in all outlets, however this type of framing can prove to be dangerous in 
that it sets the consumer’s perception that the people involved, in this case the “rioters,” 
instigated the massacre through their irrational, mob-like behavior. Considering the heavy 
casualties of this massacre, this framing makes the football fans look even more like irrational 
and erratic masses. This kind of representation sets a tone for American viewers on what their 
perceptions of Egyptians are. One may very well derive that the uprising on January 25th was 
started from such mob-mentality. 
With Morsi’s election, the speculation on how influential he would be and what kinds of 
ominous actions he may break the peace treaty with Israel and change the “power dynamic” in 
the region was rife in Fox News coverage. This continual association of Islamism with fear and 
anti-Americanism is still rife in broadcast news outlets and give American viewers a 
dehumanizing view not of Morsi, but of Egyptians as a whole. 
 
Afterword 
Throughout our case studies, we see a wide gap in how and to what extent Orientalist 
representation is utilized between mainstream broadcast media and print media. One reason to 
note why this may be is because of print journalists’ exposure to Edward Said’s work. After Said 
published Orientalism he grew in prominence with his subsequent works such as Covering Islam, 
and Culture and Imperialism, that further addressed how Orientalist representations were 
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manifested in contemporary news coverage. As a result, higher-brow print news publications 
such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal are likely to be much more aware of 
Orientalism and aspects of Orientalist representations, and therefore, much more likely to put 
effort against putting forth such representations. By no means does this mean that Said’s work is 
beginning to lose relevance. In fact, this slow transformation in how the Middle East is being 
covered, particularly Egypt as it undergoes many sudden changes and traumatic incidents from 
their Arab Spring, shows most strongly that Said’s work is relevant. Because he exposed the 
absurd methods of simplifying and generalizing the Middle East in the news media, the steps 
being taken to prevent such representations are manifesting, even if gradually, to portray Middle 
Easterners as humans with intellectual capabilities, concerns, and individual personalities. 
In our day and age, when many depend on mainstream news media often cover news to 
cater to audiences with certain viewpoints or to corporate sponsors, it is becoming increasingly 
important to be aware of aspects that can distort a news story. Said stated in Covering Islam,  
“Every man interprets what he observes … but the terms of his interpretation are not his own; he 
has not personally formulated or even tested them … most of what he calls solid fact, sound 
interpretation, suitable presentations, every man is increasingly dependent upon the observations 
posts, the interpretation centers, the presentation depots …”102 In other words, news is often not 
reported objectively.  There are filters that the news goes through and for this reason it our duty 
to be aware of, and look language and images that may paint Middle Easterners in an Orientalist 
fashion. Without such awareness, we will be subject to viewing the incident and the people 
involved in any given story as incapable of rational thought, and most frighteningly, not human. 
Especially with how rampant Orientalist representations were in the mainstream media not too 
                                                          
102 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1981), 47. 
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long ago, this is as important as ever as Egypt, along with Syria, Tunisia, Libya and other 
countries in the region are undergoing their own unique uprisings to establish their own fair 
government in a postcolonial world. 
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